Old Dominion University

ODU Digital Commons
Graduate Program in International Studies Theses &
Dissertations

Graduate Program in International Studies

Winter 1996

"Never Draw Unless You Mean to Shoot": United
States Department of State's Responses to Property
Seizures in Latin America
Nathan D. Younge
Old Dominion University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds
Part of the International Law Commons, International Relations Commons, and the Latin
American History Commons
Recommended Citation
Younge, Nathan D.. ""Never Draw Unless You Mean to Shoot": United States Department of State's Responses to Property Seizures in
Latin America" (1996). Master of Arts (MA), thesis, International Studies, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/bzag-n679
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds/101

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Program in International Studies at ODU Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons.
For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.

“NEVER DRAW UNLESS YOU MEAN TO SHOOT”:
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S RESPONSES TO PROPERTY
SEIZURES IN LATIN AMERICA
by
NATHAN D. YOUNGE
B.A . June 1988, American University

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty o f
Old Dominion University
in Partial Fulfillment o f the Requirement for the Degree o f

MASTER OF ARTS
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
December 1996

Approved by:

•an E. Supplee (Director)

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the U .S. Departm ent o f State’s diplomatic handling of
disputes over the seizure o f U .S.-ow ned property in Latin America between 1937 and
1973. Seizures in Bolivia, Mexico, Guatem ala, Cuba, Peru and Chile are used as case
studies, and provide examples o f successful and unsuccessful diplomatic outcomes.
Several key factors are analyzed in each dispute, including whether the
Department took a conciliatory or confrontational approach toward each country, the
kind o f economic pressure applied, the situations under which the Department opted for
official diplomatic involvement, and the types o f informal facintative assistance
provided to U.S. claim ants. The thesis then attempts to determine which measures
helped to resolve outstanding disputes and which did not.
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SECTION I
OVERVIEW
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Latin American seizures o f U.S.-owned property over the last six decades have
totaled more than three billion dollars. Starting with the first major Bolivian seizure in
1937, the U.S. Departm ent o f State shouldered the responsibility o f developing a
response which balanced political, economic and security issues. In many cases,
policies developed for Latin America shaped the U.S. response in other areas o f the
world. Although the trend in Latin America since the early 1980s has shifted toward
privatization o f state-owned enterprises, U.S. handling o f property seizures in Latin
America is vital for understanding the evolution o f regional relations in this century.
This study will focus on the development o f State Department policy toward seizures in
Bolivia (1937-42), Mexico (1938-42), Guatemala (1952-54), Cuba (1959-present),
Peru (1969-73) and Chile (1970-73).
Throughout this period, the State Department faced three types o f seizures:
"nationalizations," "expropriations," and "confiscations." Each is unique and elicited
different responses from the State Department. The term "nationalization" may be
described as:
The transfer to the State, by a legislative act and in the public interest, o f
property or private rights o f a designated character, with a view to their
exploitation o r control by the State, or to their direction to a new objective by
the State.1

‘Adeoye A. Akinsanya, The Expropriation o f Multinational Property in the
Third W orld. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1980), 6.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

3

Whereas a "nationalization" usually refers to the taking o f all properties or investments
within a particular field, "expropriation" m ost often connotes the seizure o f a single
property or investment.2 A frequently used definition describes an "expropriation" as:
The procedure by which a state, in time o f peace and for reasons o f public
utility, appropriates a private property right, with or without compensation, so
as to place it at the disposal o f its public services, or o f the public generally.3
Finally, the term "confiscation" refers to the seizure of privately-owned property
without compensation, and does not necessarily imply that the seized property will be
made available for public use.4 O f these three, the State Department had to deal with
nationalizations most frequently.
This study analyzes six major property seizures, and the State D epartm ent’s
response to each dispute. The case studies include: confiscation o f a petroleum
operation in Bolivia, nationalization o f the petroleum industry in Mexico, expropriation
o f agricultural lands in Guatemala, and widespread nationalizations in Cuba, Peru, and
Chile. This effort differs from other works on the afore-mentioned property seizures
by focusing primarily on the State D epartm ent's response, and how the Department
adapted to a variety o f seizures over approxim ately four decades.

2Stefan H. Robock, "Political Risk: Identification and Assessment," Columbia
Journal of World Business 6, no. 4 (July/A ugust 1971): 13.
3Samy Friedman, Expropriation in International Law. (London: Stevens and
Sons, 1953), 3.
4Akinsanya. 3-4.
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In order to assess the State D epartm ent's perform ance, four factors in particular
will be addressed throughout the case studies. As described in more detail below, these
factors involve whether the D epartm ent was conciliatory o r confrontational in its
handling o f each dispute, the type o f economic pressure applied, the manner in which
formal diplomatic involvement proceeded and the kinds o f facilitative assistance
provided to the affected U.S. com panies. The themes vary in relevance from case to
case, but are designed to assess the consistency o f the Department’s decision making
process.
The largest issue addressed is whether the State Department adopted a
conciliatory or confrontational approach toward Latin American nations that seized
U .S. property, and how this posture affected the final outcome of each dispute. Cole
Blasier’s dichotomy o f conciliation versus confrontation will be utilized, in which he
focuses on several cases of revolutionary change in Latin America and the U.S.
governm ent's receptivity toward these new governm ents.5 Blasier contends that in
cases where W ashington has been m ore conciliatory, the outcome has been politically
advantageous for the United States. In this study, the issue of conciliation versus
confrontation will consider the kind o f property seized, the dollar amount involved, the
influence of the seized company in the United States, and the post-seizure attitudes o f
the Latin American governments involved. Finally, conciliation will be weighed
against the economic costs o f such a move.

sCole Blasier, The Hovering Giant: U.S. Responses to Revolutionary Change in
Latin America. 1910-1985. rev. ed. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985).
6-7.
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The case studies also explore the form s o f economic pressure the State
Department had at its disposal during each controversy, the reasons why it decided to
implement or withhold use o f these retaliatory measures, and the w ay in which this
decision affected the final outcome. The D epartm ent lost some o f its flexibility in
administering economic pressure when the U .S. Congress passed legislation requiring
formal economic sanctions in the case o f uncompensated seizures. Tracing the history
o f the U.S. economic response will explain why Congress believed formal sanctions
were needed, and why the Department, at the same time, opposed the move.
Next, the study analyzes conditions under which the State Department opted for
formal diplomatic involvement. In cases w here the Department interposed
diplomatically on behalf of U.S. foreign investors, did the Departm ent follow its own
policy o f waiting until the U.S. claimant had first exhausted all local remedies afforded
by the host government before interposing, or did it get involved prematurely? 6
Before the emergence o f President Franklin R oosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy, the
State Department had a reputation for being overly eager to interpose on behalf o f U.S.
citizens when involved in Latin American investment disputes. The Good Neighbor
Policy changed this by putting the importance o f long-term diplomatic relations first.
The final factor addressed is the level o f State Department diplomatic assistance
to U .S. firms that fell victim to property seizure. Included in this analysis is a review

6Many authors prefer to use the term "interpose" as opposed to "intervene”
because the latter often connotes that military force might be used. See Edwin M.
B orchard's The Diplomatic Protection o f C itizens A broad. (New York: Banks Law
Publishing Co.. 1915), 441-42.
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o f the measures taken by the Department to ensure that negotiations between private
investors and the host nation progressed in a positive, constructive manner.
The thesis is organized into three sections. Section I provides an overview o f
the historically differing U .S. and Latin Am erican viewpoints toward both property
seizures and the rights o f foreigners under international law. Section II presents six
property seizure cases occurring under Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt (Bolivia and
Mexico), Dwight D. Eisenhower (Guatemala and Cuba), and Richard M. Nixon (Peru
and Chile). The case studies are analyzed according to the above-mentioned criteria
and include examples o f both successful and failed diplomacy. The third and final
section provides an overall look at the D epartm ent's actions, describes the impact that
the Latin American experience has had on U .S. policy, and highlights the lessons
learned.
Several secondary sources helped to build the foundation for this thesis.
Foremost is Cole Blasier's The Hovering G iant, which focuses on cases o f
revolutionary change in Mexico, Bolivia, Guatem ala, Cuba and Chile, and the impact
of conciliatory or confrontational U.S. policies on bilateral relations. Meanwhile.
Expropriation of U.S. Property in South America; Nationalization o f Oil and Copper
Companies in Peru. Bolivia, and Chile by George Ingram and Expropriations of U.S.
Investments in Cuba. Mexico, and Chile by Eric N. Baklanoff both study the origins o f
three major disputes, and post-seizure interaction between the U .S. government, each
Latin American government and the affected investors. These two works inspired a
concentration on property seizures as an outgrow th o f revolutionary change. Finally.
Jessica Pernitz-Einhorn's Expropriation Politics investigates the State Department's
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decision making process toward one specific set o f expropriations in Peru. This work
sparked an interest in studying the State Departm ent’s response to property seizure
disputes.
Background for each case study came from a variety o f secondary sources.
Bryce Wood provides a good account o f the Roosevelt adm inistration’s actions toward
Bolivia’s Standard Oil seizure in The Making o f the Good Neighbor Policy. For the
M exican dispute, Lorenzo M eyer’s Mexico and the United States in the Oil
Controversy. 1971-1942 gives a thorough description o f the Mexican oil industry
nationalizations. The Guatemalan United Fruit Company land seizures drew
extensively from Stephen Rabe’s Eisenhower and Latin Am erica. Bitter Fruit: The
Untold Storv o f the American Coup in Guatemala by Stephen C. Schlesinger and
Stephen Kinzer and Richard H. Im m erm an’s well-researched The CIA in Guatemala:
The Foreign Policy o f Intervention. Tw o of the best works found on the Cuban
nationalizations are Response to Revolution; The United States and the Cuban
Revolution. 1959-1961 by Richard E. Welch, Jr. and The Cuban Nationalization: The
Demise o f Foreign Private Property by Michael W . Gordon. The Peruvian
International Petroleum Company controversy relied extensively on Jessica PernitzEinhorn’s Expropriation Politics, which used personal interviews with State
Department officials to obtain insight into the D epartm ent's decision making process
during the course o f the dispute. The Chilean nationalizations drew from such sources
as Modern Chile. 1970-1989: A Critical History by M ark Falcoff and former
Ambassador Nathaniel Davis’ first-hand account in The Last Two Years o f Salvador
Allende.
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Numerous other U.S. and foreign publications w ere used in this thesis.
However, such accounts were frequently overly critical o f either U.S. foreign policy or
Latin American attempts at political and economic reform . Examples include Standard
O il’s Bolivia Takes What It W ants. Donald R. Richberg’s The Mexican Oil Seizure,
and Communism in Guatemala 1944-54 by Ronald Schneider.

It was therefore often

difficult to strike a balance between extrem e positions.
Assessment o f the day-to-day mechanics o f the State Department’s handling of
individual property seizure disputes cam e from several key primary sources. Research
material for the Mexican, Bolivian, Guatem alan and C uban disputes was obtained from
the State Department’s Foreign Relations o f the United States and declassified State
Departm ent political and commercial documents at the National Archives. Useful
inform ation regarding the Mexican oil seizures was also found in the Library o f
C ongress’ Manuscript Reading Room collection o f the Josephus Daniels Papers. Since
most o f the internal State Department documents have not been declassified for the
more recent Cuban, Peruvian and Chilean controversies, transcripts from Congressional
testimony were used extensively.
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CHAPTER n
LATIN AMERICAN AND U .S. PERSPECTIVES
ON PROPERTY SEIZURES
D ivergent U .S. and Latin American viewpoints toward the role and utility o f
foreign investm ent have developed over nearly a century. In the wake o f the
independence movements beginning in the early 1800s, Latin American nations actively
solicited U .S. capital by offering tax breaks and special investment incentives. In the
early twentieth century, many o f those nations reassessed earlier economic programs
and, subsequently, opted for greater self-sufficiency and national control o f domestic
resources. As these nations attempted to break free from what they now viewed as
extensive foreign dependence, characterized by capital flight and exploitation by
multinational firm s, U.S. investors became prim ary targets o f nationalistic economic
reform. M eanw hile, both U.S. proponents and Latin American opponents o f
liberalized investm ent policies developed convincing arguments for their positions.
The L a tin A m erican P ersp ectiv e
Although motives for seizure o f U .S.-ow ned property varied from country to
country in Latin America, some broad generalizations can be made. As many
observers were quick to point out, not all instances o f U .S. property seizure resulted
from a desire to single-out U.S. investors as targets. Instead, Latin American nations
targeted U.S. private investment because it was so pervasive and because it impeded
nationalistic reform s. Also, whereas the United States has long viewed private foreign
investment as instrumental in boosting Latin A m erican development, some Latin
American leaders were ambivalent toward such investm ent, which they believed
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hindered economic progress. They argued that the "trickle down" approach often
touted by W ashington was an illusion. More specifically, many Latin Am erican
leaders asserted that private foreign investment actually created a monetary drain by
removing repatriated profits, rather than reinvesting earnings in the domestic economy.
Foreign enterprises also created few new job opportunities for nationals because they
squeezed out domestic entrepreneurship. External control o f vital industries such as
mining, petroleum, o r public utilities caused even greater concern because they often
left host nations powerless to determine management o f those resources. Finally,
critics opined that foreign investment inevitably introduced new cultural influences,
generally viewed as undesirable.1
The official explanations for seizures o f foreign-owned property fell into at least
one o f three categories. First, if the property was needed for public use, such as
agrarian reform or the construction of roads, then the host government had the right to
seize property. Guatemala used agrarian reform as its justification for expropriating
United Fruit Company property in 1953 and 1954, as did Cuba in seizing U.S.-owned
lands beginning in 1959. Second, the property in question may have been part o f an
industry considered vital to a nation's economic well-being and hence subject to
seizure, as was the case in C hile's 1971-1973 nationalization o f U .S.-ow ned copper

•William D. Rogers, "U.S. Investment in Latin America: A Critical Appraisal."
V irginia Journal o f International Law 11, no. 2 (March 1971): 149-50. Also, there is
a substantial amount o f literature further explaining the dependency school theories.
See, for example, Eduardo Galeano, Las venas abiertas de america latina. (Mexico
City: Siglo Veintiuno Editores, 1970), 394-404, 431-36; and Fernando Henrique
Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin A m erica. (Berkeley:
University o f California Press, 1979), 159-171.
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mines. Lastly, irresponsible behavior by the foreign investor could also justify seizure,
as illustrated by B olivia's confiscation o f Standard Oil properties in 1937." The
motivations for seizure frequently overlapped, such as in M exico's 1938 nationalization
o f the petroleum industry, Peru's 1968 expropriation o f the International Petroleum
Company, and C uba's I960 nationalization o f two U .S.-ow ned oil refineries. In these
last three cases, the affected companies were accused o f behaving irresponsibly in
industries considered o f great national economic importance.
Additionally, all Latin American nations supported the Calvo Clause, that for
decades represented one o f the most contentious legal issues in U .S.-Latin American
diplomatic relations. Named after an Argentine diplomat and publicist o f the mid
nineteenth century, the Clause declares that resident aliens are subject to the same laws
as country nationals and have no right to request diplomatic intercession from their
home government. The Calvo C lause’s justification, according to one renown
supporter, is that it "seeks to serve a legitimate function by attempting to curb the many
flagrant abuses inherent in this process o f diplomatic intervention, and hence is morally
sound."3 Several Latin American nations have insisted that the Calvo Clause be written
into contractual agreements signed by foreign investors. The procedure ensures that

3George M. Ingram, Expropriation o f U.S. Property in South America:
Nationalization o f Oil and Copper Companies in Peru. Bolivia, and C hile. (New York:
Praeger, 1974), 6-13 passim.
3Donald R. Shea, The Calvo Clause: A Problem o f Inter-American and
International Law and Diplomacy. (M inneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press,
1955), 34. For an explanation o f the Latin American view toward the Calvo Clause,
see, Ramon Betata and Ernesto Henrfquez. "La protection diplomatica de los intereses
pecuniarios extranjeros en los estados de A m erica." Proceedings of the Eighth
American Scientific Congress, vol. X (Washington. D .C .: 1940): 37-48.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

12
foreign investors are cognizant o f the host nation's rights and authority over properties
within its boundaries. Proponents o f the Clause argue that entrepreneurs are not
obligated to invest abroad and are aw are o f the inherent risks before entering
contractual agreem ents. M oreover, these advocates contend that profits made by U .S.
private investors in Latin America historically have greatly outweighed any loss
incurred from acts o f expropriation o r nationalization.4 Disagreement between U .S.
investors and Latin American supporters o f the Clause has yet to be resolved.
T h e U .S . Perspective
The U .S. governm ent historically has tried to discourage nations from
expropriating o r nationalizing foreign-owned property, since it believes foreign
investment enhances, rather than hinders, economic progress. Eric N. Baklanoff
describes the U .S . position as follows:
(1) that paym ent o f the required compensation diverts resources needed for
economic development and depletes supplies o f foreign exchange (2) property is
often transferred from com petent private hands to governments that lack the
requisite managerial skills; and (3) such actions tend to worsen the climate for
private investm ent.5
W hile the U .S. governm ent wants to dissuade expropriations or nationalizations, it
nonetheless will respect a nation's right to do so, provided the foreign government

4Shea, 35.
5Eric N. Baklanoff. Expropriations of U .S. Investments in Cuba. Mexico, and
C hile. (New York: Praeger. 1975), 5.
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presents U .S. investors with "just" (i.e., prom pt, adequate, and effective)
compensation.
W here U .S. policy makers have parted company w ith foreign governments has
been over the issue o f compensation. Compensation was at som e point offered during
all o f the cases under study, but differences remained as to w hether proposed
compensation was both prom pt and adequate. Over time, the State Department moved
away from insisting upon a "just" compensation in favor o f "prompt" compensation.
Foreign nations often have been unable fully to recompense U .S . investors for their
losses. Thus, the Departm ent has, albeit unofficially, adopted the pragmatic view that
it is better to receive at least some compensation for monetary losses rather than none at
all.6 The D epartm ent's demand for just compensation must therefore be weighed
against its desire for continued cordial diplom atic relations.
The issue o f the Calvo Clause has created a legal dilem m a for the United States.
While W ashington no longer demands annulm ent o f this provision, or attempts to deter
U.S. investors from entering contractual agreements containing the Clause, it does
maintain that the Clause cannot serve to prevent diplomatic interposition on behalf of
U.S. nationals. The U .S. justifies its position based on the Vattelian formula, which
contends:

5Ibid., 2.
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an injury to a national is an injury to the state o f that national, thus giving the
state rights o f recovery independent o f the rights o f the individual and not
affected by the individual's contractual w aiver.7
Although the U.S. governm ent does not consider itself legally barred from interposing
in Calvo Clause cases, the Clause can, under certain conditions, be a determinant in
deciding whether or not the U .S. governm ent will sponsor a claim .8
The timing o f U .S. diplomatic involvement is another important consideration.
The U.S. interpretation o f international law prohibits the State Department from
interposing until an actual seizure o f U .S.-ow ned property has taken place. If a
claimant acknowledges receipt o f compensation, the Department does not need to
become involved. If, how ever, a claimant has not received just compensation and has
met the D epartm ent's requirem ent for exhausting (or attempting to exhaust) all local
remedies, the Department then can officially present this claim before a foreign
government.9
Once the Departm ent becomes involved in assessing the value o f seized
property, innumerable problems can arise. Optimally, both the U.S. government and
private investors prefer that the host nation pay a fair market value for seized
properties, a value calculated as though the seizure had not taken place or as though the

7For further information regarding Emmeric de Vattel and the Vattelian formula
see. Shea, 45.
8Ibid., 42-45.
9Ibid., 96-98. For a thorough discussion on the origin o f the U.S. position
toward the exhaustion o f local remedies, see. Green Haywood Hackworth, Digest of
International Law. (W ashington. D .C .: GPO, 1943), 5:501-26.
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threat o f seizure had not arisen.10 It is frequently impossible, however, for either the
investor o r the U .S. government to ascertain realistically these figures.
Three alternative methods exist for determining property valuation. The first,
called a going-concern approach, analyzes an enterprise's past perform ance to
determine projections o f future profitability and earnings o f the seized property. From
the investor's perspective, this method is preferred, particularly in cases involving
abundant m ineral or petroleum resources. A second approach looks at the
"replacement cost" o f the property at the time o f seizure, minus the property’s
depreciation. This method does not count projected future earnings, and thus produces
a lower valuation figure than either a fair market value or going-concern approach.
The third method assesses the "book value" o f the seized property by subtracting the
property's depreciation from the original purchase price. O f the three procedures, the
latter is considered least representative of the investor's property value unless the
property was purchased recently with few or no new capital improvements.
Compounding the assessment problem are drastically fluctuating inflation and exchange
rates, or significant lapses between the settlement date and the date at which
compensation is actually awarded. Furthermore, the market value o f service-oriented
enterprises is often difficult to assess. In comparison with manufacturing and
agricultural properties, their value is based more on continuous business and

l0Richard J. Smith provides a concise explanation o f all o f these methods o f
valuation in "The United States Government Perspective on Expropriation and
Investment in Developing Countries," Vanderbilt Journal o f Transnational Law 9, no. 3
(Summer 1976): 519-20.
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prospective profits than fixed assets.11 These issues will be further analyzed in Section
II.
U .S. policy also dictates that property seizures by foreign governments cannot
be levied discriminately against U.S. investors. Laws prom oting property seizure must
apply equally to all foreign or domestically-owned properties residing in the host
nation.12 However, claims o f discrimination are often difficult to substantiate.
The 1963 Congressional Committee on Foreign Affairs publication,
Expropriation o f American-owned Property by Foreign Governments in the Twentieth
Century, accurately summarizes the U.S. governm ent's view toward property seizures:
First, the United States has a responsibility in protecting the property o f its
citizens abroad. Second, such actions may impair good international relations
and cause strained relations to deteriorate further. T hird, they inhibit the
private investment in underdeveloped countries which the United States has
sought as one method o f promoting economic developm ent.13
Regarding the third tenet o f the above quote, abrupt termination o f foreign private
investment is deemed detrimental to the host nation because it may hamper the

"Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Legislation on Foreign
Claims: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs 99th Cong., 2d sess., II and
16 September 1986, 25-26.
I2Baklanoff, 5.
I3Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Expropriation o f Americanowned Property bv Foreign Governments in the Twentieth C entury, report prepared by
Ellen C. Collier. 88th C ong., 1st sess., 1963. Committee Print, vii.
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performance o f the affected enterprises, interrupt production, or cancel essential
expertise needed to operate such investments.

Conclusion
The ideological differences toward the role o f foreign investment were well
known both to U .S. and Latin American political leaders, and neither side expended
much effort debating these issues. Rather, as the following case studies reveal, the
State D epartm ent's decision to develop a conciliatory o r confrontational posture
depended m ore upon extra-regional threats, such as com m unist expansion or impending
world w ar, or the perceived treatm ent o f the affected investors. These factors
determined the U .S. desire to use confrontational measures, such as strong economic
pressure, o r a conciliatory, protracted process o f negotiation.
Differing views concerning the actual mechanics o f State Department post
seizure involvement were more open to debate, and it was here that both the U.S. and
Latin American governments found room to maneuver. For example, the Department
was immediately confronted in each case with the question o f the appropriateness of
diplomatic involvement. W hile cognizant that each Latin American government
involved either explicitly o r implicitly subscribed to the Calvo Clause, the Department
had to weigh diplomatic involvement against the possible long-term impact such a
move could have on bilateral and hemispheric relations and the potential for further
retaliation against other foreign-owned properties in the host nation. In cases where the
State Department passed the initial hurdles and negotiated settlements, the question of
just compensation proved most difficult to resolve. Although compensation would at
some point be offered during each o f the disputes presented in Section II. none of the
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seized companies were ever offered what they considered fair m arket value as
compensation for their seized properties. Instead, compensation offers were based on
book value, extracted from the affected investor's most recent valuation for tax
purposes, or some lower figure. W hile this is certainly an issue the Departm ent
preferred to watch from the sidelines, providing informal assistance, it inevitably
handled compensation through formal diplomatic involvement.
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CHAPTER DI
THE ERA OF THE GOOD NEIGHBOR POLICY:
BOLIVIA AND MEXICO
The State Department's com m itm ent to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt's
Good N eighbor Policy received two o f its strongest tests in Bolivia and Mexico in the
late 1930s. In 1937 Bolivia confiscated property owned by Standard Oil Company o f
New Jersey. The following year, the governm ent o f Mexico nationalized its petroleum
industry. Both events provided the D epartm ent o f State with its first large-scale
exposure to property seizures in Latin A m erica and challenged President Roosevelt's
promise o f non-intervention in the affairs o f our southern neighbors. The State
Departm ent attempted to balance the risk o f econom ic loss and concern over setting a
detrimental precedent against the long-range concerns o f maintaining the spirit o f the
Good N eighbor Policy and the need for securing allies during a tumultuous pre-war
period. This balancing act yielded sim ilar results in both countries, as the State
Departm ent came to agreement with Bolivia and Mexico after a prolonged period of
negotiation.

Bolim
Although the dollar amount o f the property taken in Bolivia was meager
compared to later seizures, it gave the State D epartm ent a formal introduction to the
problems it would face in the coming decades. The Bolivian action forced the
Department to confront for the first time the questions o f appropriate representation
that should be made on behalf o f U .S. investors and the proper degree of economic
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pressure to be levied against nations that seized U .S. property. The dispute proved to
be easier than others the Department w ould have to resolve.

Background
Standard Oil began its Bolivian operations in 1922 under a fifty-year
governm ent concession. In March 1937 Bolivian President David Toro, w ithout
w arning, announced the confiscation o f the com pany’s Bolivian subsidiary fo r violating
its concession. The Toro government claim ed the company had violated its original
concession agreement in three ways. First, it maintained that the company had illegally
exported petroleum to Argentina between L925 and 1926 through a "clandestine"
pipeline under the Bermejo River w ithout prior governm ent knowledge or consent.
Second, the government accused Standard Oil o f being remiss in its payment o f back
taxes. Third, it alleged that the company had failed to cooperate with Bolivia during
the Chaco War both by refusing to supply aviation fuel w hen requested and by refusing
to furnish the government with a $5 m illion loan solicited for the war effo rt.1 With
these accusations, the battle lines between the two sides had been drawn.
In addition to these three official charges, the governm ent had other reasons to
confiscate. First, widespread international criticism o f Standard Oil’s activities,
including suspicions that it had incited the Chaco War (in which Bolivia was defeated),
had significant impact on Bolivia’s decision. For example, well-publicized declarations
by Senator Huey Long on the floor o f the U .S. Congress accusing Standard Oil o f

‘Memorandum from Grumman to Hull, 2 August 1934. 824.6363 St 2/34,
Record Group 59 (hereafter, RG 59), National Archives. Washington, D .C .: Ingram.
111-17.
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instigating the w ar convinced Bolivian leaders that the company was unpopular in
W ashington and, therefore, would not receive diplom atic assistance if the subsidiary’s
holdings w ere confiscated. Second, Bolivia claim ed that the subsidiary had not
produced oil in sufficient quantities to meet dom estic needs, causing the country to
import larger amounts o f oil than it considered necessary. In other w ords, Bolivia had
to purchase high-priced foreign oil while its dom estic resources rem ained largely
untapped and in the hands o f a foreign company. T hird, observers noted that Bolivia’s
demoralizing military defeat at the hands o f the Paraguayans had caused public support
to wane for the year-old government o f President T o ro .2 Toro seized Standard O il’s
property in part to boost national morale and restore public confidence in the
presidency.
Standard Oil officials moved quickly to defend their position by addressing
T oro's charges. They admitted having exported oil to Argentina, but stated that the
action had occurred with full knowledge o f the Bolivian government. Furthermore,
they claimed that such activity by the subsidiary was fully permitted under the
concession agreem ent.3 As to the second point. Standard Oil executives, while
acknowledging that the company had failed to pay the necessary taxes, claimed their
action was justified. Shortly after signing the concession in 1922, the company and the

2Congress, Senate, Senator Huey P. Long o f Louisiana speaking on a
reservation to a W orld Court resolution, 74th C ong., 1st sess.. Congressional Record
(28 January 1935), vol. 79, pt. 1, 1046-47; Bryce W ood, The Making o f the Good
Neighbor Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 162; and Telegram
from Norweb to Hull. 18 March 1937, 824.6363 *St 2 /81, RG 59.
S tan d ard Oil Company o f New Jersey, Bolivia Takes What It Wants (New
York: Standard Oil Company, 1941), 12-13.
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Bolivian governm ent became embroiled in a tax dispute. T he problem stemmed from
differing interpretations as to what constituted "production.” In exchange for a drilling
concession, according to the contract, the subsidiary was required to pay a sliding
surface rental tax to Bolivia over a seven-year period. The tax was to increase
incrementally from 2.5 centavos per hectare at the start o f production to an eventual
rate o f 50 centavos. The Bolivian government alleged that production had to begin two
years after the contract was signed, as required by a 1921 national petroleum law.
Com pany officials disagreed, arguing that the term production implied production on a
commercial level, a stage which the company had not reached even four years after
comm encing operations. Not until 1928 did both parties reach a compromise, agreeing
that the company would begin payment o f the maximum surface rental tax (50 centavos
per hectare) on 1 January 1930. This agreement was abruptly terminated in 1931 by
B olivia's new President, Daniel Salamanca, who demanded that the company pay the
sliding rental tax back to 1924, thereby returning the governm ent to its original
position. Standard Oil appealed its case through Bolivian legal channels and eventually
received a hearing before the Bolivian Supreme C ourt.4 The case still had not been
decided when the Toro government seized the subsidiary's holdings in 1937.
Standard Oil defended itself against the third charge o f noncompliance during
the Chaco W ar by asserting that it simply could not meet the governm ent's demands,
including its request for a $5 million war loan, because the subsidiary lacked sufficient
capital. M oreover, since Standard Oil was a multinational corporation with extensive

4Letter from Palmer to Duggan. 18 March 1937. 824.6363 St 2/70. RG 59.
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global investments, it did not want to endanger its operations elsewhere by taking sides
in regional disputes.5
Lastly, Standard Oil countered Bolivia’s complaint o f low production by
explaining that although the company had poured over $17 million into projects in
Bolivia by the early 1930s, it had become discouraged with the profitability o f its
Bolivian operations. The tremendous drop in world oil prices in the 1920s and the
increased threat o f war between Paraguay and Bolivia led Standard Oil to believe that
further capital investment and increased production in Bolivia was unwise. By 1932
the subsidiary had ceased drilling new w ells.6 A fter countering Toro's charges.
Standard Oil executives concluded that its only recourse was to appeal directly to the
State Department, since it expected little cooperation from the Bolivian government.

The State Department Response
Initial State Department response to T o ro 's confiscation was mild. From a
policy standpoint. Department officials decided to uphold the stance of non
interference, reasoning that a simple expression o f concern would suffice. Secretary of
State Cordell Hull instructed his M inister to Bolivia, R. Henry Norweb, to express
U.S. dissatisfaction to the Bolivian government and to acquire as much information as
possible from all participants. The Secretary then ordered the U.S. Minister not to let
himself or any other legation official become directly involved in the dispute. The only
measure taken by Minister Norweb at this stage was to informally assist company
executives by persuading the Bolivian governm ent to grant Standard Oil representatives

sIngram, 115.
6Ibid.. 112-13.
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access to documents still housed in its form er La Paz headquarters, as they were vital to
the com pany’s defense.7 The D epartm ent's actions appeared commensurate with the
perceived level o f severity o f the seizure.
Despite the D epartm ent’s initial gestures, the U.S. private sector pressed for
greater involvement. Standard Oil representatives in La Paz and Washington
immediately pushed for official representation after the confiscation. Additionally,
U.S. corporations with no direct interest in Bolivia expressed concern over the
Standard Oil controversy to the State D epartm ent. An example o f such domestic
sentiment was iterated by James D. Mooney o f General Motors in a letter to Secretary
Hull:
As far as I know, this reported action on Bolivia's part is the first important rift
that has appeared in [sic] the scene, and I am only fearful that it might, if
tolerated, start the spread o f a contagion capable of undoing much o f the good
you have so happily done.8
The Department could not ignore expressions o f concern from such powerful business
leaders.
Instead o f directly interposing, the D epartm ent searched for alternative means to
pressure the Bolivian government. Department officials urged the company to resolve

7Department o f State, Foreign Relations o f the United States: 1937.
(W ashington, D .C .: GPO, 1954), 5:28-29 [hereafter cited as FRUS with year and
volume number]; Telegram from Hull to N orw eb, 26 April 1937, 824.6363 St 2/90,
RG 59; M emorandum from Duggan to W elles, 19 April 1937, 824.6363 St 2/108, RG
59; and Telegram from Norweb to Hull. 18 M arch 1937, 824.6363 St 2/70.
RG 59.
T e tte r from Mooney to Hull, 28 April 1937. 824.6363 St 2/117. RG 59.
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its problems through Bolivia's legal system. M oreover, the Department applied
indirect pressure by silently curtailing new bilateral econom ic and technical assistance
with the expressed message that the Bolivian governm ent had to reconcile its
disagreem ent with Standard Oil before such assistance could be resumed.9
A fter transmitting its initial instructions to the U .S. Legation in La Paz, State
Department officials delved into the thornier questions surrounding the Department's
legal right to interpose in the dispute should the need arise. O f primary concern was
the Calvo Clause in the concession contract signed by Standard Oil in 1922. To
resolve this issue, officials from the Division o f Latin A m erican Affairs consulted the
State D epartm ent's legal adviser, Green H ackw orth. A fter researching earlier cases
where U .S . investors had signed contractual agreements containing the Calvo Clause.
Mr. Hackworth presented his colleagues with two legal precedences supporting the
governm ent's right to represent private investors officially: the North American
Dredging Com pany case in 1926 and the International Fisheries Company case in 1931.
both o f which dealt with property disputes in M exico. From these cases, Mr.
Hackworth concluded that the U.S. governm ent did have the right to interpose
diplomatically in the Bolivian dispute, regardless o f the C lause, so long as Standard Oil

9Irwin F. Gellman. Good Neighbor Diplomacy: United States Policies in Latin
America. 1933-1945. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1979). 50.
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first exhausted, or dem onstrated an effort to exhaust, all local rem edies.10 For the
moment, however, U nder Secretary Sumner W elles rejected this option, stating that:
in view o f the fact that the concession contained the Calvo Clause, diplomatic
intervention on the p art o f the United States is unwarranted and, on the grounds
o f policy, unw ise.11
Welles recommended, instead, that Standard Oil present its case before the Bolivian
Supreme Court. However, Standard O il's attorneys, and even some Department
officials, commented privately that the Bolivian justices were unquestionably biased
against Standard Oil, subject to tremendous dom estic pressure, and would probably rule
against the company regardless o f the merits o f the case.12 Nevertheless, to meet the
Departm ent's requirem ent for future assistance, the company filed suit in Bolivia in
March 1938.
The Bolivian Suprem e Court took an entire year to render a decision. Delay
resulted from several interruptions, including the drafting o f a new constitution in
October 1938 by President German Busch (who had deposed Toro in July 1937),
appointment o f new justices, and a campaign o f media harassment against the Court,

I0Telegram from Division of Latin A m erican Affairs to W elles, 25 March 1937,
824.6363 St 2/89, RG 59; Memorandum from Flournoy to Hackworth, 9 April 1937,
824.6363 St 2/106, RG 59. For details o f both cases see Shea, 194-240; and Frederick
Sherwood Dunn, The D iplom atic Protection o f Americans in M exico. (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1933), 406-18.
"M em orandum from Welles to Hackworth. 8 November 1937, 824.6363 St
2/189, RG 59.
l2TeIegram from Norweb to Hull, 18 March 1937, 824.6363 St 2/81. RG 59;
and Memorandum from Hackworth to W elles, 26 March 1937. 824.6363 St 2/103. RG
59.
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which caused one o f the justices to resign. The Supreme C ourt finally ruled in March
1939 that Standard Oil could not file suit against the State.13 The com pany now
maintained that it had exhausted all legal remedies afforded by Bolivia, refused to
continue direct communication with the Bolivian government, and increased pressure
on the State Departm ent to act.
Following this effort, in the spring o f 1939 the State D epartm ent commenced
secret, but unofficial, discussions with the Bolivian Minister to W ashington, Luis
Fernando Guachalla, hoping to impress upon him the difficulty that this dispute might
create for future bilateral economic and political relations. The M inister’s involvement
in these discussions was strictly on a "personal" level. No notice o f these preliminary
meetings was relayed back to La Paz, and with good reason.14 Forem ost, there was
strong Bolivian opposition to any compromise with Standard Oil, and discovery o f such
activities at too early a stage would prove disastrous for the Busch. Also, the Supreme
Court decision had clearly nullified Standard O il’s legal right to receive compensation
for its former properties. The parties involved believed, however, that a solution
agreeable to all could, and should, be sought. Over the next six months, the Bolivian
M inister, State Department officials, and Standard Oil executives drafted a series o f
proposals for establishing an arbitral board. Eventually, in early 1940, the participants
agreed upon a proposal suggesting the creation o f a tribunal to determ ine not only the

13W ood, 181.
14Memorandum from Butler to Welles, 11 April 1939. 824.6363 St 2/372. RG
59.
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amount o f compensation owed the company, but also the am ount owed the Bolivian
government by Standard Oil from the unresolved taxation dispute.
Tw o untimely events undermined these negotiations. T he first arose with the
suicide o f President Busch in the sum m er o f 1939. Carlos Q uintanilla succeeded him
as provisional president until April 1940, when General Enrique Penaranda won
election. Penaranda, like his predecessors, desired bilateral assistance from the United
States, but proved equally reluctant to alter his nation's position on the confiscation
decision. The second event occurred in February 1940 when the Bolivian Minister sent
a draft proposal to his superiors in La Paz for review . Before his governm ent could
analyze the document, it was leaked to the Bolivian press, giving M inister Guachalla no
choice but to flatly deny that negotiations had taken place. A fter these setbacks, the
State D epartm ent decided to reiterate to the new Bolivian President its determination to
obtain compensation for Standard O il, informing him that an equitable settlement was a
prerequisite for further U.S. bilateral assistance.15 Negotiations remained at a
standstill.
Heightened international tension soon altered the U.S. position. The threat of
impending world war compelled W ashington to establish cordial relations with its Latin
American neighbors, for both reasons o f hemispheric security and access to vital
natural resources. The Roosevelt administration was determined to avoid a repeat of
the disharmony in hemispheric relations which had existed throughout W orld War I.

l5The provisional government o f Carlos Quintanilla was also denied an
extension o f credit because o f the oil controversy. FRUS 1937. 5:320-21; Wood. 18385: and FRUS 1940. 5:516-17.
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when seven Latin American nations opted for strict neutrality. The desired method of
assurance was through military and economic assistance agreements across Latin
America. Department officials expressed particular concern over the possibility o f a
Bolivian-German agreem ent, giving Germany access to Bolivia’s petroleum resources.16
The State Department increased its involvement to ensure a favorable solution.
As the threat o f w ar increased and negotiations once again stalled between the
two parties, the State Department acted over company objections to keep Bolivia in the
U .S. camp. Despite the unsettled $3 million property dispute, the Department
prepared to loan Bolivia $25 million. In late 1941, the Department again informed
Penaranda o f its desire that he reach an equitable settlem ent with Standard Oil but. also
stated that it would follow through with the loan in the interest o f hemispheric
solidarity.17 The next move lay with Bolivia.
The U.S. concession, coupled with U.S. entry into the Second W orld W ar in
December 1941 had a conciliatory effect on the Bolivian government. As its
contribution to hemispheric unity, the Bolivian Foreign M inister arrived at the Rio de
Janeiro Meeting o f Foreign Ministers in late January o f 1942 with President

l6GeIlman. 120-126; and Ingram, 118.
I7W ood. 196.
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Penaranda's permission to seek a prompt solution to the Standard Oil dispute.18 U.S.
and Bolivian officials commenced negotiations at once.
Standard Oil initially opposed the manner in which negotiations progressed.
Company representatives protested Bolivia's low offers, rem inding the State
Departm ent that they were demanding $3 million in com pensation. They eventually
yielded to Under Secretary o f State Sumner W elles' persuasion and agreed to leave all
negotiations regarding the sum o f compensation, and even the w ording o f the final
agreem ent, to the discretion o f Department officials. One can deduce from company
dialogues, however, that Standard Oil was less concerned w ith the monetary settlement
than it was with saving face and preventing a detrimental precedent. The final
agreem ent required that Bolivia pay Standard Oil $1.5 million plus three percent
interest, which meant a total o f $1.7 million in com pensation.19 This figure was just
over one-half the compensation figure requested by Standard Oil.
A t the end o f negotiations. President Penaranda approached the Bolivian
Congress with a fa it accompli o f not just "a signed agreem ent, but [also] the
irrevocable action o f a cash settlem ent."20 To pacify critics. President Penaranda
explained that the settlement opened the door for Bolivia to receive its $25 million

18Telegram from Rio de Janeiro to the Department o f State, 16 January 1942,
824.6363 St 2/558. RG 59. The two-week Rio meeting had been called to address the
problems facing the hemisphere as a result o f W orld W ar II. A rthur P. W hitaker. "The
Inter-American System," in Inter-American Affairs: 1942. ed. A rthur P. W hitaker
(New York, Columbia University Press: 1943), 11-15.
19State Department Press Release, 16 February 1942, 824.6363 St 2/606. RG
59; and Wood, 197. 199.
:0W ood, 199.
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economic development loan from the United States. He further justified his actions by
reminding the Bolivian Congress that the amount paid to Standard Oil was a mere ten
percent o f the $17 million the company had invested. M oreover, he declared that the
sum paid was not so much in compensation for the subsidiary's confiscation, as it was
an exchange for maps and data possessed by the company w hich, he asserted, Bolivian
technicians deemed invaluable for future petroleum exploration.21 The Bolivian
Congress reluctantly complied, thus ending the oil controversy.
The Bolivian dispute revealed that the State Departm ent could balance its
involvement in Latin American investment disputes against the provisions set forth in
the Good Neighbor Policy. The Department withstood pressure from the private
sector, used moderate economic pressure, and interposed only when talks reached a
standstill. Self-restraint was only breached once the threat o f W orld W ar II made
prompt resolution an imperative. The D epartm ent's approach would be repeated once
again toward Mexico.

Mexico
As in Bolivia, M exico's outright nationalization o f its oil industry in 1938 came
as a surprise to the State Department and the sixteen affected Mexican and foreign
firms. Although conflict had erupted frequently since commencement o f the Mexican
Revolution in 1911, as successive Mexican governments imposed greater demands on
an increasingly hostile industry, few believed that the Lazaro Cardenas government
would attempt such a daring move. As Standard Oil o f New Jersey, Cities Service

2lIbid.. 200: and Blasier. 87.
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Group, the Sinclair G roup, the Sabalo Group, and other U .S. companies turned to the
State Department for assistance, the Department would once again have to weigh its
involvement in this larger and more difficult dispute against its desire to adhere to the
Good Neighbor Policy.

Background
U .S. involvement in M exico's oil industry began under the dictatorship o f
Porfirio Diaz (1876-1880, 1884-1911). President Diaz sought to encourage increased
foreign investment through tax incentives, exemption from constrictive legislation, and
sundry privileges, which he hoped in turn would lead to infrastructure developm ent and
economic growth. To spur investment in the extractive industries, Diaz implemented
measures to override the colonial-era Spanish principle declaring state ownership o f
subsoil resources." Since the domestic elite opted to concentrate on the traditional
activities o f ranching and agriculture, it was U .S ., British, and Dutch venture capital
that led Mexican oil exploration starting in the early 1900s.
The ouster o f Diaz and beginning o f the Mexican Revolution in 1911 led to the
"golden era" o f oil production, which lasted until 1921. This period coincided with
W orld W ar I, the initial boom o f the U.S. automobile industry, and the most turbulent
years o f the Mexican Revolution. However, a decade-long reversal began in 1921.
attributable in large part to wasteful overproduction, an unstable political climate, taxes

“ Lorenzo Meyer. Mexico and the United States in the Oil Controversy. 19171942. (Austin: University o f Texas Press, 1972), 31; Antonio J. Bermudez, The
Mexican National Petroleum Industry: A Case Study in Nationalization. (Stanford:
Institute o f Hispanic American and Luso-Brazilian Studies, 1963), 2; and George W.
Grayson, The Politics o f Mexican Oil. (Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press.
1980), 9.
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imposed by the early Revolutionary governments o f Fransisco M adero and Victoriano
Huerta, and more promising discoveries in Peru and Venezuela.23 These trends are
demonstrated graphically in Figure 1.
Promulgation o f the 1917 Constitution under President Venustiano Carranza
(1914, 1915-1920) further unsettled foreign oil interests. Article 27 o f the
Constitution, which affirmed national sovereignty over subsoil resources, led the oil
companies (now 90 percent foreign owned) to question whether the provision was
intended to apply retroactively to oil producing lands. Such a move would constitute a
reversal o f subsoil rights awarded years earlier by President Dfaz. Mexican nationalists
argued that the constitutional provision should apply retroactively, as it superseded all
previous laws. So as not to provoke a crisis, C arranza repeatedly assured the oil
companies and the State Department that the retroactivity o f Article 27 was not directed
at the petroleum industry, and settled instead for imposing new taxes on oil
production.24 D espite Carranza's overtures, uncertainty over Article 27 remained a
point o f contention between the United States and Mexico.
Failure to fully allay private sector concerns led the State Department to
pressure the M exican government for clarification. President W arren G. Harding’s

^Johnathan C. Brown, "W hy Foreign Oil Companies Shifted Their Production
from Mexico to Venezuela during the 1920s," T he American Historical Review 90. no
2 (April 1985): 383-85; Wendell Chaffee G ordon. The Expropriation o f ForeignOwned Property in Mexico. (Washington, D .C .: A m erican Council on Public Affairs,
1941), 54 and 59; and Meyer, 31, 32, 87.
24George W ard Stocking, "The Mexican Oil Problem ," Arnold Foundation
Studies in Public Affairs 6, no. 4 (Spring 1938): 2: Amos J. Peaslee, Constitutions of
Nations. (Concord: The Rumford Press. 1950), 2:421-26: and M eyer. 57. 59-61.
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governm ent withheld diplomatic recognition to President Alvaro Obregon in 1921 after
C arranza's assassination. In exchange for recognition, the State Department demanded
that the Mexican government first establish a formal agreem ent to safeguard private
investment in Mexico and clarify the issue o f retroactivity. Obregon held his ground,
insisting that recognition precede such an agreement. Not until the end o f O bregon's
presidency were differences settled. Although no treaty was signed, the two
governments reached an understanding in the summer o f 1923 known as the Bucareli
Agreement. Mexico offered the oil companies concessions o f unlimited duration for
those lands on which "positive acts" had been perform ed. Since the agreement
established a broad definition o f what constituted a "positive act," almost all petroleum
properties fell within this category.25 Despite these generous concessions on b eh alf of
the petroleum industry, the agreement was a partial victory for Mexico because it
forced the United States to tacitly acknowledge state ownership o f subsoil resources.
The investment climate was again shaken in 1925 under O bregon's successor,
Plutarco Ellas Calles (1924-1928). Calles' 1925 Petroleum Law brought into question
the status o f the oil industry by requiring that the oil companies receive government
confirmation o f their holdings and by reducing the previously agreed-upon concessions
o f unlimited duration to a period o f fifty years. After prolonged negotiations, U .S.
Ambassador Dwight M orrow in 1928 managed to obtain favorable conditions for the
oil companies by convincing President Calles to amend contentious segments o f the

^M eyer. 78-82. 102.
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Petroleum L aw .26 Calles' successors, Portes Gil (1928-1930), Ortiz Rubio (19301932), and Abeiardo Rodriguez (1932-1934), all adhered to the 1928 agreem ent, and
the period o f tranquility lasted until President Lazaro Cardenas assumed office in 1934.
President Cardenas (1934-1940) proved more determined than his predecessors
to implement substantial socio-economic reform s. He wanted to nationalize the
railroads and public utilities, reform agrarian holdings, and reduce foreign economic
dependence.27 Confronting the oil companies, how ever, would soon become his most
difficult undertaking.
The passing o f the 1936 Expropriation Law initiated Cardenas’ dispute with the
oil companies. The law declared M exico's right to expropriate any property needed for
public use, specifying that compensation be paid within ten years. Under pressure
from U.S. oil companies, the State Department sought Cardenas’ assurance that the law
was not targeted at petroleum producers. Cardenas replied that the law only applied to
those suspended operations vital to the nation's well-being, and therefore did not affect
petroleum interests. The first application o f the law came against the railroad industry
(which was largely U.S.-owned). The following year, despite Cardenas' earlier
promises, the law targeted the oil industry.28 Although both industries were o f

26Claudia Anne Finney, "The Good Neighbor Policy and the Standard Oil
Company o f New Jersey: The Case o f Oil Expropriation in Mexico," (M .A . thesis.
University o f Oregon, 1982), 36.; and M eyer, 148.
27Sociedad Mexicana de Geograffa y Estadfstica, Accion v Pensamiento Vivos
rte l azaro Cardenas. (Mexico: Federacion Editorial Mexicana, 1973), 15-49.
28David E. Cronon. Josephus Daniels in M exico. (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1960), 127-28; FRUS 1937. 5:681-83: Meyer. 154; and Julio C.
Trevino, "M exico." in Expropriation in the Americas: A Comparative Law Study, ed.
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comparable value, the greater strategic importance o f the oil industry and its more
powerful lobbying efforts in Washington caused the State Department to give greater
attention to the petroleum dispute than the plight o f railroad investors.
The 1936-1938 conflict between sixteen o f M exico's largest oil companies and
the Syndicate o f Oil Workers o f the Mexican Republic (STPRM) became the primary
catalyst for nationalization. The STPRM desired an industry-wide collective contract
with the oil com panies, which called for many well-deserved dem ands, and others that
were blatantly exorbitant and undoubtedly included for bargaining leverage. The
companies agreed in principle to the idea o f a collective contract, but insisted that union
demands far exceeded what the companies were capable of paying. Consequently, the
STPRM struck. O ver the next two years, neither m anagem ent-labor conventions,
arbitral reviews, nor appeals to M exico's Suprem e C ourt resolved the dispute. While
each governm ent review found unanimously in favor o f the STPRM , the oil companies
refused to com prom ise, believing that Mexico had neither the desire nor ability to run
the industry. And, in mid-1937, the companies even threatened to halt production until
it reached more agreeable terms.29 To their surprise, however, a government takeover
followed in short order.
The true crisis arrived when the oil com panies appealed the STPRM 's demands
to M exico's Supreme Court. On 1 March 1938 the Supreme C ourt upheld earlier
findings by the Federal Board o f Conciliation and A rbitration's Special Group Seven

Andreas F. Lowenfeld (New York: Dunellen, 1971), 128-30, 134.
29The STPRM was a consolidation o f tw enty-one independent oil worker unions.
Cronon, 161: Bermudez. 12-13.; and Finney. 56.
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that the companies w ere capable of m eeting the STPR M 's dem ands, and set a 7 March
deadline for compliance. As last minute negotiations ensued. President Cardenas twice
extended the deadline. Meanwhile, the companies again threatened to halt production,
and the Mexican governm ent warned that it would seize their properties. When the
companies once again refused to comply on 18 March, President Cardenas announced
his decision to nationalize the sixteen largest oil companies. The legal vehicle was the
1936 Expropriation Law, which guaranteed full compensation within ten years.50 As
expected, the U.S. oil companies immediately turned to the State Department for
diplom atic assistance.

The State Department Response
The Mexican nationalizations highlighted numerous problem s for the State
Departm ent. The D epartm ent had a long history o f interposing to aid U.S. oil
companies obtain favorable conditions and clarification o f M exican legislation. Also,
since a large sum o f money was in dispute, the U.S. companies would undoubtedly
press hard for diplomatic representation. The nationalization therefore could not go
uncontested, but the Department would have to weigh its response against the tenets o f
the Good Neighbor Policy.
Differing camps developed w ithin the Roosevelt administration immediately
after nationalization as to the appropriate U.S. response. On one side, Secretary of
State Cordell Hull, U nder Secretary Sum ner Welles, and several career diplomats

30Although sixteen companies w ere immediately seized, 40 others (27 o f which
were foreign-owned) were not affected because their employees were not unionized.
C ronon, 166-67; M eyer. 158-59, 166-169; FRUS 1937. 5:661-64; FRUS 1938 5:72527; Bermudez, 15; and W . Gordon, 95.
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urged that a hard-line approach be used. On the other side, U .S. Ambassador to
Mexico Josephus Daniels and Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau believed the U.S.
government should remain completely outside the controversy and let the firms resolve
their own difficulties.31 President Roosevelt would have to make the final decision.
Ambassador Daniels had a profound influence on this debate. The prestigious
septuagenarian ambassador had served as Secretary o f the Navy under President
W oodrow Wilson from 1913-1920, with Franklin D. Roosevelt as his Assistant
Secretary. Both Roosevelt and Daniels had maintained a close friendship since that
time and, as ambassador to Mexico, Daniels had far more access to the President than
his rank denoted. Consequently, Daniels appealed directly to Roosevelt when he
deemed it necessary. At the height o f the Mexican dispute, the Ambassador wrote
President Roosevelt:
I read last night (I d o n 't get much time for reading in these hectic
days) a letter which Theodore Roosevelt wrote to Taft on December 22,
1910: "As I utterly disbelieve in the policy o f bluff, in national and
international affairs, or any violation o f the old frontier maxim: 'N ever
draw unless you mean to shoot,' I do not believe in taking any position
anywhere unless we can make g o o d ." That sound maxim has presentday application.32

31Fredrick B. Pike, FD R ’s Good-Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years o f Generally
Gentle Chaos. (Austin: University o f Texas Press. 1995), 192-93; Meyer, 186-87.
32Josephus Daniels letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 6 April 1938. Josephus
Daniels Papers. Library o f Congress. M anuscript Reading Room. Washington. D.C
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As the correspondence implies, the Ambassador recommended that his superiors
exercise patience and flexibility in dealing w ith Mexico. Meanwhile, he expressed
little sympathy for the oil companies, which he felt were quite deserving o f M exico's
actions. W hile Ambassador Daniels endured a great deal o f criticism for his position,
others later credited him with having preserved U .S.-M exican relations during this
troubled period o f international politics by superseding the wishes o f the oil companies
for the sake o f longer-range political objectives.33 The road to a solution, however,
was not without obstacles.
Despite the Administration's framework o f non-interference, the State
Department took several initial steps to pressure Mexico into negotiating. The first
occurred eight days after nationalization, when Department economic adviser Herbert
Feis recommended that Treasury Secretary M orgenthau suspend the 1936 U.S. silver
purchasing agreem ent with Mexico. Feis knew that the sanction would serve mainly as
a psychological scare, but believed that it could prove effective if the Treasury were to
lower simultaneously its global purchase price o f silver, thereby preventing Mexican
circumvention by selling silver to the United States on the open market. And, in order
to protect other friendly silver producing countries from the global price reduction, Feis
suggested that the United States immediately establish purchasing arrangements with
those nations.34

33C ronon, 272-89.
34W ood. 223.
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Morgenthau and Daniels both opposed the proposed sanction. W hile they
agreed the measure would both weaken the peso and d isrupt Mexican mine production,
they did not believe it would be sufficient to cause the Cardenas administration to
change direction, nor, in their opinion, was it in the b est interest o f long-term U.S.Mexican relations. Moreover, M orgenthau apparently disliked this State Department
encroachment on Treasury Department domain. The T reasury Secretary insisted he
would comply with Feis’ plan only if the State D epartm ent made a formal request. It
came the following day. Morgenthau announced cessation o f silver purchases from
Mexico on 27 March, and lowered the Treasury purchasing price for silver over the
next two days.j5
The sanction failed for several reasons. First, even though canceling Mexican
silver purchases did create economic hardship, M exico's determination to withstand
such pressure rendered W ashington's action pointless. Second, despite the global price
decrease, Mexico still managed to sell some silver to the United States on the open
market, where the country of origin is unknown. T hird, the sanction caused weakening
o f the peso, which reduced Mexican purchases o f U .S. goods, thereby harming the
U.S. economy as well. Finally, the Mexican silver industry was between 70 and 80
percent U .S.-ow ned. As potential hostage companies. U .S.-ow ned mining companies
feared that they too might face nationalization if such policies continued. Through
their powerful Washington lobby, the silver producers made it clear that they did not

35Cronon. 190-93; Letter from Daniels to Roosevelt. 29 March 1938, Josephus
Daniels Papers: and John Morton Blum, From the M orgenthau Diaries: Years of
Crisis. 1928-1938. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Com pany. 1959), 1:495-96.
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want to suffer because o f oil industry problems. As a result, the Treasury Department
unofficially rescinded the sanction in the sum m er o f 1938, with President Roosevelt's
approval.36
While the silver sanctions were in progress. Secretary Hull prepared a second
State Department response, an official com m unique protesting the nationalizations. In
reviewing the letter, Ambassador Daniels expressed concern to the Secretary that the
document was too strongly worded, and persuaded the Secretary to modify the tone.
Then, reluctantly, Daniels delivered the letter on 28 March. President Cardenas' reply
came two days later, when he informed Daniels that the protest was unacceptable, since
his government had already expressed, on numerous occasions, its intention to provide
compensation. Daniels understood that official delivery o f this letter would result in a
break in diplomatic relations, and, without consulting Departm ent superiors, agreed
privately with President Cardenas to view the letter as not having been officially
delivered. The Ambassador then delayed his requested return to Washington for
consultation until the last possible moment in order to minimize the potential
importance o f the trip. He believed that he could accomplish m ore by remaining in
M exico.37 Few besides Ambassador Daniels could have undertaken such an
insubordinate course without serious reprimand.

36The silver industry employed over 100,000 Mexicans (versus 16,000 in the oil
industry) and provided the Mexican government with 10 percent o f its revenue.
Josephus Daniels, Shirt Sleeve Diplomat. (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina
Press, 1947), 249-50; Grayson, 17-18; and Blum, 497.
37FRUS 1938. 5:756-57; and Cronon. 197.
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Two other forms o f economic pressure supplemented these initial measures.
Indirectly, the State D epartm ent gave tacit approval to the efforts o f U .S. oil companies
to discourage Latin A m erican and European nations from purchasing Mexican
petroleum products. M ore directly, the Department ceased to issue new loans or renew
current loans to M exico.38 The declining custom er base for petroleum products and
dwindling bilateral assistance caused considerable economic hardship in M exico, but
failed to force the nation into a settlement.
These measures created economic hardship in Mexico. The problems caused by
the oil boycott, finding new markets, and maintaining production weighed heavily on
the Cardenas administration. Shortly after nationalization, a power struggle
exacerbated the crisis. Cardenas had to impress upon the workers the impossibility of
granting union demands under strained economic conditions.39 If anything, economic
pressure probably served to further delay M exico's ability to compensate the
companies.
Meanwhile, the plight o f British and Dutch investors, whose collective
petroleum investments w ere much larger than those o f the United States, demonstrated
the perils o f pursuing a hard-line policy. G reat Britain delivered a note of sim ilar tone
to the one "unofficially" delivered by Daniels, thereby causing a break in relations in
May 1938, while the Dutch government showed more patience and managed to

38Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics o f U .S.-Latin American
Relations. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 79. W ood, 228-33.
39Meyer, 181-82.
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maintain diplomatic ties.40 Mexico realized, however, that U.S. strategic concerns
outweighed Anglo-Dutch commercials interests, and therefore managed to defer
settlement with the European nations until it first came to terms with the United States.
Between mid-1938 and late 1941, despite frequent consultation with Mexican
officials in both M exico City and W ashington, the State Department chose not to
interpose officially in the controversy. The Department hoped that a series o f
negotiations between Donald R. Richberg (an attorney representing the U .S. oil
companies) and the Mexican government could produce a settlement. These talks
collapsed in Novem ber 1939. At the same time, the Department subm itted several
suggestions for compromise and arbitration. Most o f its proposals called for some
form o f limited partnership between the oil companies and the M exican government,
allowing the companies regularly to extract a percentage o f revenue until compensation
was fully paid. Both parties dismissed all proposals for joint ventures and arbitration.
The Mexican governm ent rejected the concept o f a jo in t venture because it refused,
under any condition, to allow the oil companies to return to Mexico. Then, in early
1940, Mexico asserted that it would not even discuss arbitration because it felt that no
outside body had authority to adjudicate national policy. The oil companies also
rejected arbitration or joint ventures, stating they would settle for nothing less than the
full return o f their properties.41 The dispute had reached an impasse.

" Ib id ., 183-84.
41FRUS 1940. 5:1001-03; Donald R. Richberg, The Mexican Oil Seizure. (New
York: Arrow Press, 1940), 36-47 passim: and W ood, 239-46.
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The oil com panies opted to wait for a better settlement. With the upcoming
L940 presidential elections in both the United States and Mexico, they predicted that
new, more sym pathetic governments would come to pow er. The companies were
disappointed, how ever, when the election results in both countries w ent contrary to
their desires.42 T hey now realized that a favorable solution was unlikely.
Between the collapse o f the Richberg talks in November 1939, and the fall o f
1941, several factors caused W ashington to shift its stance toward the Mexican
nationalization. First, the U .S.-ow ned Sinclair group broke away from the other oil
companies and reached a separate settlement with the M exican government in May
1940. Second, the threat o f world w ar, which would also prompt a Bolivian
settlement, made U .S . cooperation with its closest Latin American neighbor
imperative. In o rd er to protect the strategically vital Panama Canal, the United States
wished to obtain m ilitary cooperation and establish air bases on Mexican soil. Third,
Mexico had m anaged to find new markets for its petroleum in Germany, Italy, Japan,
and six Latin A m erican nations despite the propaganda campaign and boycott. Finally,
the United States had made headway in negotiations with Mexico on a number of
outstanding agrarian claims that had accumulated over the years.43 W hile the agrarian
seizures were not considered o f vital importance, and received little diplomatic

42Cardenas-backed Avila Camacho won the presidential race in Mexico, while
Roosevelt was elected to a third term. Daniels. Shirt Sleeve Diplomat. 260-61.
43J. Richard Powell, The Mexican Petroleum Industry: 1938-1950. (New York:
Russell & Russell. 1972), 113; FRUS 1940 5:1056-62; and Lipson, 77.
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attention compared to the oil dispute, progress on these negotiations showed that the
Mexican government could be reasoned w ith on the oil issue.
While Mexico rejected the idea o f arbitration, it did propose in M arch 1940 that
a U .S.-M exican commission be established to assess the value o f the oil com panies’
properties. The Mexican governm ent maintained that such a valuation had to take
place before it would even consider discussing compensation. T he State Department
mulled over this proposal for more than a year, hoping either that M exico would agree
to third-party arbitration, or that the oil companies would som ehow manage to resolve
their problems independently. The U .S. companies, however, continued with their
unrealistic demand for restitution o f the seized properties. Finally, through an
exchange o f notes in November 1941, the Department superseded the companies'
demands and formally agreed to participate in assessing the value o f the seized
properties. This step opened the way for a final settlement by a two-person
commission. In order to expedite the w ork o f the commission and prevent further
complications, both governments decided, in advance, to agree upon a general figure
for compensation.44 The valuation and behind-the-scenes bargaining ran from July
through November 1941.
From January through mid-April 1942, a commission headed by Manuel J.
Zevada from Mexico and M orris L. Cooke from the United States, worked out a joint
report announcing the final compensation figure, as described in Table 1. The sum of
$23,995,991 would be owed the oil companies, payable in large part from oil profits

“ Meyer. 222-24.
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Cooke Zevada Agreement, 17 April 1942
Standard Oil Co. o f N ew Jersey g r o u p ........................................................$18,391,641
Standard Oil Co. o f California g r o u p ............................................................ $3,159,158
Sabalo g r o u p ....................................................................................................... $897,671
Consolidated Oil Co. g r o u p ............................................................................. $630,151
Seaboard Oil Co. g r o u p .................................................................................... $487,370
Total .................................................................................................... $23,995,991
Plus interest to date o f final payment (1 9 4 7 )...................................$3,985,964

Grand total ....................................................................................................$27,981,955
Independent Settlements
Sinclair group ....................................................................................................$8,500,000
Cities Service group

...................................................................................... $1,100,000

Mexican Eagle (Royal Dutch-Shell) g r o u p .................................................$81,250,000
Plus interest to date o f final payment (1 9 6 2 )................................ $49,088,868

Grand total ..................................................................................................$130,338,868
Table 1 Mexican Oil Settlements. Source, Bermudez, 24-26.
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over a five year period, following a $9 million initial cash payment by M exico. In
exchange, W ashington agreed to a new silver purchasing agreement w ith Mexico,
coupled with Export-Im port Bank financing, and currency stabilization m easures.45
After reaching this settlement, Secretary of State Cordell Hull pressured the oil
companies to accept. He informed them that it was the best solution the Department
could offer and he invited the oil companies to either accept this solution or continue on
their own. The Secretary made it clear that by declining the Cooke-Zevada
Agreement, they should no longer expect support from the Department.46 The
companies deliberated for almost a year before accepting M exico's offer, thus ending
the Mexican controversy eighteen months after the Bolivian settlement.

Conclusion
The most striking policy decision to evolve from the Bolivian and Mexican
disputes was the U .S. retreat from prom pt diplomatic intervention. Under President
Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy, private U .S. companies found they no longer could
expect unconditional support from the Department o f State to protect their properties
abroad. This was a clear shift in policy from the Republican administrations that
preceded Roosevelt.

45Mr. Cooke was an engineer and technical consultant for the Office o f
Production M anagement. Department o f State, Department o f State Bulletin, vol. V,
no. 130 (20 December 1941): 563; Idem, "Payment for Expropriated Petroleum
Properties." 25 and 29 September 1943. Treaties and Other International Agreements
o f the United States o f America. 1776-1949. (Washington, D .C .: GPO, 1972), 9:115054.
46Meyer, 224.
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In addition to this new U.S. position, the State Department set several specific
policy precedents with respect to future conflicts. First, although the Department could
have intervened more, it decided to remain on the sidelines as long as negotiations were
taking place and to facilitate communication betw een both groups. Only after the threat
o f hemispheric involvement in World W ar II becam e overwhelming did the Department
interpose to break the stalemate in both cases.
Second, even though no official policy or legislation existed concerning
uncompensated property seizures, the State D epartm ent experimented with the
suspension o f bilateral assistance in both disputes. Curtailm ent o f new bilateral
assistance proved useful, and the State Department would use this policy during every
dispute that followed. The Department went even further in the Mexican controversy
by recommending cessation of silver purchases and by aiding U .S. oil companies in
their boycott o f Mexican petroleum products. These tactics failed because Mexico
managed to circumvent the petroleum boycott and the Department soon realized that
halting silver purchases hurt not only Mexico, but the U.S. economy as well.
Third, the State Department revised U .S. policy toward compensation. In order
to secure any compensation whatsoever without m ilitary intervention, the State
Department worked out compromises. Since the Bolivian seizure was a confiscation,
which did not require compensation, the Pefiaranda government had to develop a
justification for paying Standard Oil which would be palatable to domestic critics. The
Mexican dispute caused Washington to relax its dem and that compensation precede
nationalization by a host government. Instead, the State Department accepted a smaller
payment spread out over five years.
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Fourth, the Bolivian and Mexican settlements were accompanied by substantial
economic and military assistance from the United States. While W orld W ar II clearly
played a role, the offer o f renewed aid undoubtedly prompted both nations to resolve
these controversies.
In the end, the U.S. policy o f patience and flexibility during a period when
hemispheric solidarity was crucial, rather than strong-arm tactics (such as economic
sanctions), encouraged both sides to negotiate settlements. The following cases o f
Guatemala and Cuba, however, illustrate the failure o f diplomacy to resolve similar
dilemmas during a dramatically different Cold W ar environment under the Eisenhower
administration.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

52
CHAPTER IV
COLD WAR SEIZURES: GUATEMALA AND CUBA
Fifteen years after the Roosevelt adm inistration confronted the first major
property seizures in Latin America, the Eisenhower administration encountered new
seizures in Guatemala in 1953, and later in C uba in 1959. Whereas Roosevelt had to
balance his Latin American dealings against the threat o f a forth-coming global
conflict, the new bipolar world that emerged from W orld W ar II shaped Eisenhow er’s
response. Key Latin American policy decisions had to be weighed against possible
Soviet penetration o f the hemisphere. To ward o ff communism and enhance economic
stability in the tumultuous days o f the Cold W ar, the W hite House strongly promoted
liberalized trade and investment policies throughout the Third World. Developing
nations were advised to generate growth by offering lucrative climates for foreign
investors, with "trade not aid" as the m otto.1 Such policies clashed with the rising tide
o f nationalism in the post-war period, particularly in Guatemala and Cuba. Under the
Eisenhower administration's Cold W ar policies, the State Department turned away
from the Good Neighbor Policy, and maintained a hard line stance toward property
seizures in Latin America.

Guatemala
Guatemala was the first country in the hem isphere to seize U.S. property in the
post-w ar era. In 1953 and 1954, the Guatemalan government o f Jacobo Arbenz
G uzm an expropriated land owned by the United Fruit Company. The dollar am ount in

•Stephen Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin A m erica. (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press. 1988), 64-65.
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dispute was m inor, yet the State Department became heavily involved. The
Departm ent's actions reveal that it was more greatly influenced by the association made
between the A rbenz government and international communism than the seizure o f U .S.owned property.

Background
The origin o f the United Fruit Com pany's interests in Guatemala began with
Captain Lorenzo Dow Baker, a U .S. merchant, who in 1870 was one o f the first
entrepreneurs to venture into the Caribbean banana trade. In succeeding years, he
established the Boston Fruit Company, bought out com petitors, and came to dominate
the banana trade in Central America. Under the new name of the United Fruit
Company, B aker's enterprise established a subsidiary in Guatemala in the early 1900s,
known as the Companfa Agricola. Over the next four decades, the subsidiary
purchased large tracts o f land, constructed a railroad, and acquired the port facilities of
Puerto Barrios on the nation's east coast.2 The Guatem alan government approved the
subsidiary's expansion. Ties between the governm ent and the company were
particularly close during the administration o f dictator Jorge Ubico Castaneda (19301944).
The developm ent o f a strong nationalist m ovem ent eroded public support for the
Ubico dictatorship in the early 1940s. A revolt led by Guatemala’s small middle class,
comprised o f ju n io r officers, middle-level governm ent employees, teachers, and

’T hom as P. McCann, An American Company: The Tragedy o f United Fruit.
(New York: Crow n Publishers, 1976), 15; and G uillerm o Toriello, La batalla de
Guatemala. (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 1955), 33-40.
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students, culminated in President Ubico’s ouster in the summer o f 1944. Organizers of
the movement drafted Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo Bermejo, a Guatemalan teacher living in
exile in Argentina, to run as their presidential candidate. Although he had no previous
political experience, Dr. Arevalo became the nation's first democratically elected
president in M arch 1945. He initiated the Guatemalan Revolution with a promise of
"agrarian reform , protection o f labor, a better educational system and consolidation o f
political dem ocracy. "3
A revalo's government began a program o f agrarian reform which met resistance
at home and abroad. In addition to sponsoring programs to educate farmers on
increasing productivity, prom ote scientific experimentation with new farming
techniques, and control land rent, his Administration implemented the Law o f Forced
Rental, which enabled peasants to apply for access to unused lands owned by large
estates.4 These moves nevertheless were quite modest, and only touched the surface of
the nation's agrarian reform problems.
A revalo's nationalistic goals faced many obstacles. Although he served out his
term, he had to devote much o f his time to maintaining political stability and
suppressing coup attempts. President Harry Truman compounded these problems in
1948 by embargoing arms transfers to Guatemala to show disapproval o f Guatemala's

3Stephen C. Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of
the American Coup in Guatemala. (New York: Anchor Press, 1983), 28, 30-31, 37.
“Schlesinger and Kinzer, 41; and Richard H. Immerman. The CIA in
Guatemala: The Foreign Policy o f Intervention. (Austin: University o f Texas Press.
1982), 52-53.
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political reform measures and its reluctance to take a decidedly pro-W estern stance.5
Thus, Arevalo had little opportunity to fully implement his slated programs.
President A revalo's moderate reform program was followed by the more
vigorous social and agrarian reform policies o f his successor, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman.
The Arbenz administration sponsored the A grarian Reform Law (Congressional Decree
900), passed in June 1952, which put him in direct conflict w ith the United Fruit
Company. The law asserted the state's right to expropriate large tracts of dormant,
uncultivated land for redistribution to the peasants.6 Initially, the Agrarian Reform
Law was used against elite landowners, but in 1953 Arbenz switched his attention to
the United Fruit Company, the nation's largest single landowner. In March 1953, the
government announced the expropriation o f 233,973 acres o f company-owned land on
Guatemala's Pacific coast at Tiquisate, explaining that the property consisted o f
"unproductive and vacant lands that were o f no real benefit to the company or its
stockholders."7 It offered as compensation three percent agrarian bonds of twenty-five
year maturity. Using the com pany's tax figures from May 1952 to determine monetary

G u atem ala’s refusal to sign the 1947 Treaty o f Reciprocal Assistance, which
sought to ensure the signatories protection from armed aggression and its alleged
support for the anti-dictatorial Caribbean Legion, combined with the perceived
potential for Soviet penetration, were factors influencing T rum an's arms embargo
decision. For further analysis, see, Imm erm an, 109-110; Ronald Schneider,
Communism in Guatemala 1944-54. (New York: Praeger, 1959), 25-31; and
Schlesinger and Kinzer, 42-45, 104.
'Toriello, 172-73.
d e p a rtm e n t o f State, "Expropriation o f United Fruit Company Property by
Government o f Guatemala," Department o f State Bulletin 29, no. 742, (14 September
1953): 358.
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com pensation, the government offered $627,572 in bonds. Arbenz argued the offer
was fair since the firm had purchased the land at an exceptionally low price and had
paid very low taxes on it. M oreover, the government considered its agrarian reform
measures equitable because they affected the properties o f nationals and foreigners
equally.8 T o grant U .S. investors immunity was inadmissible.
T he United Fruit Company immediately took issue with the expropriation. It
appealed directly to the Guatemalan Supreme Court to overturn the measure. The
company claim ed that it had been severely discriminated against, and that compensation
offered was far below the land's fair m arket value, which it estimated at nearly $16
million. One month after the seizure, the Guatemalan Supreme Court decided in favor
o f the governm ent, thus rejecting United Fruit's appeal to rescind the expropriation.
Seeing no further hope for legal recourse through Guatemalan courts, the company
commenced heavy lobbying through its powerful connections in Washington for U .S.
governm ent assistance.

The State Department Response
The M arch 1953 seizure added to the Department o f State's growing list o f
concerns over events in Guatemala. Foremost was A rbenz's left-leaning ideology and
courtship w ith domestic communist factions -- a trend which it had monitored
intensively since 1952. Both the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) recognized that the Soviet Union had, until this point, only served as an

8Ibid.. 357; McCann, 49. Guatemala's policy on discrimination stems from
Article 21 o f the Republic's constitution which prohibits "all discrimination for reason
o f race, sex. nationality, or political beliefs.” See. Toriello. 176.
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ideological fram ew ork for home-grown Guatemalan com m unism , but feared even the
mere existence o f communist parties as a precursor to formal ties with the Soviet bloc,
giving communism a strong foothold in the A m ericas.9 These concerns increased U.S.
antagonism tow ard Arbenz in 1953 and 1954.
With a clear understanding o f the Eisenhower adm inistration's perspective,
United Fruit appealed to W ashington for assistance, hoping that direct diplomatic
pressure would lead either to substantial compensation for, o r restitution of, the seized
property. Its strategy was to exploit W ashington's communist fears, which it did
through a strong media campaign, direct consultation with high-level officials through
personal contacts, and distribution o f a periodic newsletter to State Department
personnel on Guatemalan political events.10 The company reasoned that concentrating
on the issue o f communism rather than the protection o f a multinational corporation
would accomplish the goal o f restoring favorable business conditions to Guatemala,
without further tarnishing the company's corporate image in Latin America.

9The Soviet Union had only established formal diplom atic relations with
Argentina, M exico, and Uruguay by 1953. Rabe, Eisenhower in Latin America. 9192.
10There were several close ties between the adm inistration and United Fruit.
Allen and John Foster Dulles, for example, had previously represented the company as
members o f Sullivan & Cromwell, a Wall Street law firm. Special Assistant to the
President for national security affairs Robert C utler and U .S. Ambassador Robert Hill
were among the other government officials with ties to United Fruit. Ed Whitman, the
husband o f President Eisenhower's personal secretary, Ann W hitm an, worked as
United Fruit's public relations chief during the 1950s, as did form er Senator Robert
LaFollette and form er Under Secretary o f State Spruille Braden. Also, United Nations
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge had previously represented United Fruit’s home state
o f Massachusetts as a U.S. senator, and continued to be a company stockholder. See
McCann, 55-58; Immerman, 115, 124-25.
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The Guatemalan President did little to dispel these fears. Arbenz undeniably
afforded the communists significant attention, in p art as a means o f repayment for their
political and campaign support. He allowed the communists to form official parties,
and appointed several acknowledged communists to political positions, but there is little
indication that Arbenz was, him self, a com m unist." He did. how ever, seriously
misjudge the political climate in W ashington, and his failure to allay U .S. concerns in
the midst o f the Cold W ar proved fatal to the Guatemalan Revolution.
The State Department soon responded to United Fruit's com plaints. When the
company submitted a detailed explanation o f its position to the D epartm ent in mid1953, the Department in turn, officially presented these points to the Guatemalan
Ambassador in W ashington on 28 August 1953.12 The aide-memoire was the most
significant formal correspondence to exchange hands over the seizure dispute.
As outlined in this communication, the Department upheld several of United
Fruit’s points o f contention. First, it asserted that the bonds constituted neither
adequate nor prom pt compensation. Due to the low annual interest rate o f only three
percent, and the uncertainty o f their market value upon maturation, the bonds offered
were inadequate. Furtherm ore, the compensation offer was by no means prompt, since
the twenty-five year maturation period would expire in 1978, by which time few of the
com pany's current shareholders would realize direct benefit. Second, the company

"Despite A rbenz's ties to the left, he appointed no known communists to
cabinet or sub-cabinet level posts. Schneider, 22-25.
l2For full text o f the aide-mem oir, see Department o f State, "Expropriation of
United Fruit Company Property by Government o f G uatem ala.” 358-60.
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disagreed with using the land's assessed tax value in determining appropriate
compensation. United Fruit claimed that the disputed land, purchased between L928
and 1930, had been undeveloped and properly assessed for taxation purposes.
Although Guatemalan law required a reassessment o f land taxes every five years, from
1930 to 1950, no appraisals were made. United Fruit finally hired its own appraisers
in 1951. The governm ent, however, failed to enter the results into the nation's official
tax register, o r explain why. M oreover, the government did not permit the company to
analyze the appraisal documents prior to expropriation, as required under Guatemalan
law. Thus, w hen expropriation occurred in 1953, the tax value utilized was based on
the land's assessed value from over twenty years prior. Third, the company claimed
that the land taken could not be justly classified as "uncultivated land” because it had
provided both pasture and forestry uses. The company maintained that it annually
extracted from the region large quantities o f lumber and materials used to further
banana production. It also leased portions o f this land to its employees who produced
fruits, vegetables, and raised cattle for private consumption. Fourth, the expropriated
land was vital to the Compaiifa A gricola as an alternative resource to ensure against the
Panama disease, which had. in the past, destroyed 7,000 acres o f company land,
forcing abandonment o f the infected property.13 Consequently, the company held that
retention o f vast acreage was economically necessary and justifiable.
The State Department added a few points o f its own to United F ruit's claims.
Although it acknowledged the legality o f expropriations that affected both foreign and

13Ibid., 358-59. See also. Cable from Leddy to Cabot and Mann. 26 February
1953. 714.00/2-2653. RG 59.
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domestic property owners equally, it questioned the accuracy o f A rbenz's assertion that
the expropriation was non-discriminatory in nature. A t the time o f the Tiquisate
expropriation, the Department noted, approxim ately tw o-thirds o f the total amount of
land expropriated had belonged to United Fruit. M oreover, ratification o f a new plan
would result in expropriation o f an additional 172.532 acres o f company land on the
Atlantic coast. This action would weaken Guatemalan claims o f non-discrimination.
The Department emphasized that such discrim inatory actions toward foreigners or their
property violated international law .14
Over the next several months, the State D epartm ent suggested to the
Guatemalan government several means o f settlement, including direct negotiation and
arbitration. Arbenz initially rejected these proposals, but changed his mind after six
months o f increased political and economic pressure from Washington. On 9 February
1954 (three weeks before the Tenth Inter-American Conference) Guatemalan Foreign
M inister Guillermo Toriello proposed that the dispute be referred to a neutral
commission for settlement. In response, U.S. Am bassador John E. Peurifoy, following
instructions from the State Department, relayed several points to M inister Toriello.
First, the Ambassador expressed the Departm ent’s preference that the issue be resolved
through direct negotiation between the company and the Guatemalan government.
Second, Ambassador Peurifoy lectured the Foreign M inister on the ease with which
U.S. companies had resolved past disputes through direct discussion with other Latin
American governments. Third, he informed the Foreign Minister that the need for

l4Ibid.
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resolving the dispute was a factor o f "high, but not prim ary importance" in U.S.Guatemalan relations.15 This final point seems to indicate that communism was now o f
greater concern to W ashington than the United Fruit dispute. Diplomatic relations had
deteriorated to the point w here settlement o f the United Fruit dispute would no longer
suffice to change the Eisenhower adm inistration’s impression o f Guatemala. The
situation rem ained deadlocked until mid-1954.
Less than a week after Guatemala City and W ashington had failed to reach a
compromise, the Arbenz governm ent announced its second expropriation decision
affecting United Fruit land. The new announcement called for expropriation of
173,790 acres o f Compama A gricola's land on the Atlantic coast, in Bananera. In
compensation Guatemala offered $557,542, also in the form o f long-term low interest
bonds.16 A strong diplomatic response from W ashington was inevitable.
One month later, the State Department filed a formal claim against Guatemala
on behalf o f United Fruit. The 20 April 1954 com munique announced that Guatemala
owed $6,984,223 plus $8,737,600 in severance damages for the Tiquisate seizure.17
The fact that only one year had passed before official Department espousal o f a claim
illustrates the Eisenhower adm inistration's greater willingness to interpose in the
Guatemalan case.

lsCable from Dulles to Peurifoy, 20 February 1954, 714.00/2-954, RG 59.
16Toriello, 40.
17Departm ent o f State. "Formal Claim Filed Against the Guatemalan
Government," Department o f State Bulletin 30. no. 775 (3 May 1954): 678-79.
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The State Department implemented no formal sanctions against G uatem ala in
response to the United Fruit dispute, but it did display its dissatisfaction w ith Arbenz's
policies by bringing economic and political pressures to bear on the country. President
Eisenhower continued the em bargo on military aid begun by the Truman
adm inistration.18 The United States subsequently curtailed bilateral econom ic assistance
to Guatemala between 1952 (after enactment o f the Agrarian Reform Law) and 1954,
as shown in Figure 2. Seizure o f U.S.-owned property solidified support for these
policies. Additionally, as a natural response to the Agrarian Reform Law, and
requiring little encouragement from Washington, private investors prom ptly withdrew
over $12 million from Guatemala in 1952 and 1953.19 The seizure o f U .S.-ow ned
property solidified support for the Administration's actions, while capital flight placed
increased pressure on G uatem ala’s economy.
With differences between the two nations growing increasingly acute in 1954,
the State Department used the Tenth Inter-American Conference in Caracas to exert
further political pressure on the left-leaning Arbenz government. Although the March
1954 Conference was intended as an economic summit, the State Departm ent
successfully lobbied to alter the agenda, adding a proposed declaration denouncing
communism in the Americas, with Guatemala as the implied target. In preparing for
the Conference, Secretary Dulles reminded his staff to avoid discussion o f United
Fruit's difficulties, because he feared the Guatemalan delegates would attem pt to defeat

18Cable from Clark to M ann, 4 December 1952, 714.00/11-2252. RG 59.
I9Department o f Commerce "Guatemalan Economic Trend D ow nw ard." Foreign
Commerce Weekly 50. no. 26 (28 December 1953): 4.
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the anti-com m unist measure by linking U.S. actions to the fruit com pany's interests.
The Secretary correctly anticipated the Guatemalan response, but the conferees
nevertheless overwhelm ingly approved his anti-com m unist declaration.20 The Caracas
D eclaration gave W ashington a license to exert greater pressure on the Arbenz
governm ent.
Arbenz could not reverse the tide. His prediction two years earlier that
G uatem ala would be subjected to "terrific pressure [to] readjust the government's
policy toward communism" exceeded his expectations, as it ultimately led to his
overthrow in June 1954.21 Arbenz had neither the military support or popular backing
needed to save his presidency.
The full extent o f U .S. involvement in the Arbenz overthrow is still under
debate. W hat is known for certain is that an exiled Guatemalan arm y colonel, Carlos
Enrique Castillo Armas, with a small group o f arm ed rebels known as the Liberation
Arm y, managed successfully to enter Guatemala and execute a virtually bloodless coup.
Arbenz opted to cede his position peacefully rather than risk confrontation with forces
o f unknow n size and strength, especially given that his own army declined to come to
his defense. It is also known that the State D epartm ent had been approached on several
occasions with proposals designed to topple the A rbenz government, and that it did
wish to see Arbenz replaced. The most likely scenario is that the U .S. government and

20The U.S. declaration passed by a vote o f seventeen to one. Guatemala cast the
only negative vote, Argentina and Mexico abstained, and Costa Rica gave a supporting
vote in absentia. For text o f the declaration, see. Department o f State, Intervention o f
International Communism in Guatemala. (W ashington, D .C .: GPO, 1954), 8-9.
2ICable from C lark to Mann, 4 December 1952. 714.00/11-2252. RG 59.
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anti-Arbenz neighboring nations at a minimum provided logistical support for the
Liberation Army to commence operations, and that inaction by Guatem ala’s regular
army during the assault sealed A rbenz’s f a t e .22
The United States and Guatemala moved quickly to re-establish friendly
relations following the coup. Among President Castillo A rm as' first acts were
annulment o f Arevalo's 1945 Constitution, abrogation o f A rbenz's A grarian Reform
Law, and restitution o f United Fruit's expropriated lands. Armas then moved to
eradicate communism from Guatemala by establishing the National Committee for
Defense Against Communism, and by dismantling trade unions and peasant
movements.23 In exchange, W ashington dramatically altered its policies toward
Guatemala. The United States lifted its embargo on m ilitary assistance following the
coup, and military aid to Guatemala rose to $3.7 million by 1963.24 Concurrently,

22For coup proposals see, M eeting between C orcoran and Mann, 15 May 1950.
714.00/5-1550; Cable from Siracusa to M ann, 4 September 1952, 714.00/8-2952, RG
59; Cable from Mann to Secretary Dulles, 3 October 1952, 714.00/10-352, RG 59;
and Cable from Mann to Whelan, 13 O ctober 1952, 714.00/10-1352, RG 59. Also,
there are varying interpretations as to the factors that led to A rbenz’s overthrow . See.
Immerman, 133-86; Frederick W. Marks III, "The CIA and Castillo Armas in
Guatemala, 1954: New Clues to an Old Puzzle," Diplomatic History. 14, no. 1 (Winter
1990): 67-86; and Stephen G. Rabe, "The Clues Didn’t C heck Out: Commentary on
'The CIA and Castillo A rm as,'" Diplomatic History. 14. no. 1 (W inter 1990): 87-95:
Paul C. C lark, Jr., The United States and Somoza. 1933-1956: A Revisionist Look.
(Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 182-84; and Schlesinger and Kinzer, 159-204.
23Johnathan Fried et. al., Guatemala in Rebellion: Unfinished H istory. (New
York: G rove Press, 1983), 62.
24Guatemala: A Country Study, ed. Richard F. N yrop, 2d ed. (W ashington.
D .C .: G PO . 1983), 132.
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U.S. bilateral economic and social aid rose to the highest level ever, with Washington
contributing $110 million between 1955 and 1960 (see Figure 2 above).
Both the State Department and the United Fruit Company achieved their short
term objectives. W hereas the D epartm ent witnessed the successful ouster o f an
unwelcome leftist-oriented Central Am erican government. United Fruit realized its goal
o f restitution o f its form er property. Relief was, however, only temporary. Successive
governments in Guatem ala failed to prosper despite the massive infusion o f bilateral
assistance, accentuated by increased maldistribution o f income during the 1960s and
severe political disorder through the early 1970s. The failures o f this hard-line State
Department policy were not yet apparent when the next crisis emerged in Fidel Castro's
Cuba.

Culm
Five years after the Guatemalan coup, the State Department encountered its
biggest Cold W ar challenge in Latin America. The 1959 victory o f Fidel Castro
ultimately resulted in the loss of nearly $2 billion by private U .S. investors. Unlike the
previous case studies, the Cuban seizures did not all occur simultaneously, nor did they
affect just a handful o f large companies within a particular industry. Instead, the
Cuban example reveals gradual nationalization o f an entire economy.

Background
Foreign investors had prospered in pre-Castro Cuba, particularly under the
dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista Zaldfvar (1952-1959), who in many ways mirrored the
earlier Diaz government in Mexico and the Ubico government in Guatemala. While
Batista welcomed foreign investment, his policies exacerbated the massive disparity
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between wealthy and poor Cubans and his administration also showed signs o f
mismanagement and corruption. By 1958 U.S. investors controlled much o f the
nation’s arable land, and several key industries and public utilities, totaling $861
million. The United States was also Cuba’s chief trading partner, purchasing $484
million o f its exports and providing $546 million in imports.25
Although the United States benefitted from Cuba’s inviting investment climate
and supported Batista in his earlier years, the State Department grew increasingly
antagonistic toward the dictator by late 1958. Both Batista's use o f increasingly harsh
measures to quell domestic opposition and his clear involvement in the fraudulent
national elections o f November 1958 contributed to the shift in Department policy.
Thus, less than one month after the elections, U.S. Ambassador Earl E. T . Smith
announced W ashington's complete withdrawal o f support for the Batista regim e.26 The
Department hoped that a reform-minded, yet moderate government would com e to
power.
The government that supplanted Batista on I January 1959 proved far from
moderate. A long history o f U .S. dominance over Cuba's internal affairs since its
independence from Spain in 1899, and W ashington’s support for consecutive corrupt

^In comparison, the United States had an estimated $781 million o f direct
investment in Mexico and $517 million in Argentina in 1958. Department o f
Commerce, "Capital Flow to Foreign Countries Slackens," Survey o f Current Business
39, no. 8 (August 1959): 30; idem. Survey o f Current Business 38. no. 12 (December
1958): S21-S22; idem. Survey o f Current Business 39. no. 12 (December 1959): S21S22.
26Rabe. Eisenhower in Latin America. 121.
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and inept Cuban governments contributed, in pan . to the hostile environment between
the United States and Cuba that began in 1959 and continues today.
Fidel Alejandro Castro Ruz spearheaded the victorious 26th o f July Movement,
which for over six years had struggled to oust the B atista regime. The Revolution's
agenda called for attacking Western capitalism head-on. Purging the Batista military
and bureaucratic structure were immediate priorities, and both bodies were replaced
with loyal revolutionary followers. Then came m ore difficult economic and political
tasks. The Revolution's economic program called fo r radical agrarian reform and
nationalization, both o f which initially targeted public utilities, but soon expanded to
include every sector. Finally, freeing Cuba from U .S . dependence was viewed as a
prerequisite for these reforms. The Castro governm ent had no preconceived plan for
offsetting U.S. economic and political dominance (a Cuban-Soviet alliance was still
over one year away), but it nevertheless forged ahead with its agenda.27 In the
meantime, the unwavering loyalty o f the Cuban masses enabled the new government to
withstand intense economic and political pressure from abroad.
To W ashington’s dismay, over the succeeding three years Castro adopted a
reform policy unprecedented in Latin America. N ational control over public utilities
ranked high on the new government’s agenda. C astro first intervened in the operations
o f an International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) subsidiary, the Cuban Telephone
Company, in March 1959. Both W ashington and IT T reacted mildly to the
intervention, believing it was only temporary, and that official diplomatic response

27Louis A. Perez, Jr., Cuba and the. United States; Ties o f Singular Intimacy.
(Athens: University o f Athens Press, 1990). 23 and 245.
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would have been premature.28 The ITT seizure, however, proved only a sample of
things to come.
Castro next moved to equalize land distribution through the Agrarian Reform
Law, promulgated in May 1959. It limited the size o f all landholdings and provided
twenty-year 4.5 percent bonds as compensation, payable in nonconvertible exchange.
Under the act, hundreds o f agrarian seizures took place over the following eighteen
months, few o f which complied with established policy. The National Institute of
Agrarian Reform (INRA), the organization responsible for carrying out the
expropriations, "arbitrarily" enacted the law and designed each decision to meet the
governm ent's current desires.29 The affected U .S. property ow ners promptly expressed
their difficulties to the State Department.
As external political and economic pressure mounted against revolutionary
measures in early 1960, the Castro governm ent located an alternate market for exports,
and a new source o f machinery, basic goods, and military hardw are in the Soviet
Union. Nikita Khrushchev’s government had, since the beginning o f the Cuban
Revolution, watched C astro's anti-capitalist and anti-U .S. gestures with great interest.
Although another year would pass before Castro publicly announced his allegiance to
M arxism, the Soviet government felt confident enough in the survivability and

28M ichael W. Gordon, The. Cuban Nationalization; The Demise o f Foreign
Private Property. (Buffalo: W illiam S. Hein & C o.. 1976), 73-74.
29For a detailed analysis o f the Agrarian Reform Law, see, cable from Bash to
Secretary Dillon. 9 October 1959. 837.16/10-959. RG 59: and M . Gordon. 75-76.
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ideological commitment o f the Revolutionary government to re-establish diplomatic
relations in May I960.30 The move cam e not a moment too soon for Cuba.
Two weeks after rapproachment with the Soviet Union, Castro initiated a chain
o f events which perm anently damaged U .S.-Cuban diplomatic relations. On 23 May
Castro ordered C uba's foreign-owned oil refineries to refine Soviet crude oil. The
U .S. and British-owned companies refused, with the approval o f their respective
governments.31 Castro responded by seizing the refineries, thereby sparking
increasingly severe reactions, making severance o f diplomatic ties inevitable.
Cuba’s intervention in the operations o f the foreign-owned oil refineries marked
the high point o f the property seizures. The nationalizations had, by m id-1960,
covered the entire spectrum o f the Cuban economy, ranging from land seizures to
manufacturing enterprises and public utilities. Castro’s actions put State Department
decision-makers to the greatest test thus-far.

The State Department Response
The State Department reacted to the Batista overthrow with guarded optimism.
It granted official recognition to the Castro government on 6 January 1959, and
promptly sought recommendations from its embassy in Havana as to the outlook for

30Richard E. W elch, Jr. Response to Revolution: The United States and the
Cuban Revolution. 1959-1961. (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press,
1985), 10-15; and Memorandum from Braddock to State Department, 18 February
1959, 611.37/2-1859, RG 59. Batista had severed diplomatic ties soon after taking
over in 1952. For more information, see, Peter G. Bourne, Fidel: A Biography o f
Fidel C astro. (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1986), 198-99.
31Pamela S. Falk, Cuban Foreign Policy. (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1986).
41-42; and Philip W. Bonsai, Cuba. Castro, and the United States. (Pittsburgh:
University of Pittsburgh Press. 1971), 151-53.
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U .S.-C uban relations. Embassy Charge d'A ffairs Daniel M. Braddock responded in
mid-February with a positive analysis. H e predicted that Castro's criticism o f the
United States and foreign investment w ould eventually subside. After a period of
adjustment, Braddock believed that C astro would prove a refreshing and welcomed
change from the Batista government. T w o days later, the State Departm ent gave its
initial endorsem ent to an International M onetary Fund (IMF) proposal for economic
assistance to C uba.32 Clearly, Braddock underestimated Castro's commitm ent to
change.
In early March, the State Departm ent replaced Ambassador Smith with the more
progressive Philip Bonsai, who appeared to be a good choice for the jo b . His
successful tour as Ambassador to Bolivia had familiarized him with the dilemmas
facing leftist governments. Bonsai recognized that the traditional view o f Cuba as a
U .S. dependency had to be revised, and he urged the State Department to exercise
patience and flexibility in dealing with the new government. The Departm ent followed
these recommendations during the first year o f the Castro government, and took a
conciliatory posture toward Cuba.33 Unfortunately, as later events revealed, Bonsai's
new outlook could do little to alleviate deep-seated Cuban bitterness over decades of
U .S. interference in its political and econom ic affairs.

32Memorandum from Braddock to Department o f State, 18 February 1959,
611.37/2-1859; and Memorandum from Snow to Dillon, 20 February 1959, 837.13/22059, RG 59.
33W elch, 29: and Bonsai. 25-30.
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W hen Castro made his first move against U .S.-ow ned property by seizing the
Cuban Telephone Company in March 1959, Ambassador Bonsai recommended that the
Department not file an official protest. Instead, he assisted company officials by
expressing their grievances, informally, to the Cuban governm ent.34 This effort had
little impact on the seizure.
W hen Cuba enacted the Agrarian Reform Law tw o months later, the
Ambassador sent his first official note to the Cuban Foreign Minister voicing concern
over the potential impact o f the governm ent's reforms on foreign-owned property. His
11 June note expressed support for the nation's agrarian reform measures, but reminded
the governm ent o f the need for just compensation and non-discrimination toward U.S.owned properties. As the year progressed, the State D epartm ent witnessed the apparent
arbitrary nature o f the agrarian seizures, few o f which com plied with the Agrarian
Reform Law. As a result, Bonsai delivered another note to President Osvaldo Dorticos
Torrado on 12 October, followed by a sum m ary note on 27 October, protesting the
manner in which the seizures were being h andled." These protests had no deterrent
effect on the Cuban government, and the pace o f nationalization continued to increase.
The true turning point in U .S.-C uban relations occurred late in early 1960. On
4 M arch, the French freighter La Coubre, loaded with a shipment o f Belgian arms,
exploded suddenly inside a busy Cuban harbor. Castro prom ptly accused the United
States o f sabotage, a charge which the State Department emphatically denied. The

^B lasier, 90.
5SBlasier. 90-91. For text o f the June 11th note, see. Note from Bonsai to
Minister o f State Agramonte, 11 June 1959. 837.16/6-1159. RG 59.
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Castro accusation, com bined with the foreign property seizures, and the growing
consensus in W ashington that Cuba was indeed turning com m unist, contributed to the
shift in Department policy. Even Ambassador Bonsai gave up hope for continued
cordial diplomatic relations. Moreover, 1960 was an election year in the United States,
and V ice President Richard Nixon, running for the Presidency, had increased antiCastro rhetoric during the course o f the cam p aig n /6 Since the Eisenhower
administration no longer saw any benefit from trying to cooperate with the Cuban
government, it shifted its attention to removing Castro by force.
W hile United States developed param ilitary plans, C astro's assault on foreignowned property continued. The on-going agrarian seizures and sporadic industrial
seizures were prom ptly overshadowed by the dispute over foreign-owned oil refineries
in the summer o f 1960. Washington considered C astro's dem and that private
petroleum refineries process Soviet crude oil intolerable, and advised the companies to
refuse his request. W hen Cuba retaliated by seizing the foreign companies between 29
June and 2 July, the W hite House responded by striking C uba at its weakest point sugar exportation. A fter the U.S. Congress quickly transferred authority over the sugar
quota to the Executive branch on 6 July, President Eisenhower announced the following
day a nearly total reduction in Cuba's sugar quota for the rem ainder o f I960.37

36Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait. (New York: Avon Books, 1986), 56871.
37The potential impact of the sugar sanction was trem endous. Approximately
700,000 tons o f Cuban sugar (almost one-quarter o f the y e ar’s harvest) was no longer
bound for the United States, leaving only 39,752 tons for the rest o f 1960. At this
stage, the Eisenhower administration gave no indication as to what it would do to the
1961 quota. M. G ordon. 98-99.
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Renewed Cuban-Soviet economic relations saved Cuba, and allowed Castro to
increase pressure on the United States. The U .S .S .R . announced immediately that it
would exchange equipment, technical assistance, and military aid for Cuban sugar.
The new market for Cuban goods enabled Castro to strike back at the United States by
implementing the Law of Nationalization. The law authorized expropriation o f U .S.owned property at Castro’s discretion, providing compensation through ’’proceeds"
from sugar sales to the United States. However, to be eligible for compensation, sales
had to exceed 1.5 million Spanish long tons annually at more than 5.75C per pound.
Upon meeting these criteria, twenty-year, two percent bonds would be issued. The
Law o f Nationalization clearly was designed to bring about a reversal o f the sugar
sanction. If this failed, Castro implied that U .S. investors should not expect
compensation for seized properties.38 At this point, the two nations were not willing to
resolve their differences. The State Department could only watch and keep records o f
the remaining seizures.
The new year brought an end to U .S.-C uban diplomatic relations. On 2 January
1961 Castro demanded that the U .S. Embassy in Havana be reduced from eighty-seven
to eleven officials within forty-eight hours. In response, Eisenhower announced on 3
January, with incoming President John F. K ennedy's approval, a break in diplomatic
and consular relations with Cuba, accompanied by a revised sugar quota o f zero for

58C uba's quantity and price demands for sugar exportation to the United States
were at inflated W orld War II levels, and hence unacceptable to the White House.
Bonsai, 151-52.
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1961. By the end o f 1961, the Kennedy administration had imposed a total embargo on
trade with C uba.39 N either diplomatic nor trade relations have since been resumed.
Although there was no longer hope o f a diplomatic solution to U .S.-C uban
difficulties, the Kennedy administration continued with plans created under President
Eisenhower to settle differences militarily. Kennedy and his advisors had hoped to
conduct an amphibious assault, using m ore than 1400 U .S.-trained Cuban exiles, which
would be followed by a mass uprising o f the Cuban people against Castro. The April
1961 assault, known as the Bay o f Pigs invasion, was plagued with tactical and
logistical errors, as the United States grossly underestimated the determination and
preparedness o f the Cuban people.'*0 The Castro government successfully resisted the
invasion, and solidified domestic support.
W ashington's problems over the Cuban nationalizations did not end with the
severance o f diplomatic relations and Bay o f Pigs fiasco because the U.S. government
had to contend with several thousand outstanding claims. To help resolve these claims,
the 1964 Congress em powered the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (FCSC)
with authority to assess the legitimacy and exact dollar am ount owed U .S. private
investors. The FCSC had been established in 1954 as a "quasi-judicial” independent
U .S. government agency that combined both the State D epartm ent's W ar Claims
Settlement Commission and the International Claims Settlement Commission under one
institution. The Commission had previously determined compensation due victims of

39W elch, 8, 59.
'“’W elch, 64-86. For more detailed coverage, see, Peter Wyden, Bay o f Pigs:
The Untold Story. (New York: Simon & Schuster. 1979).
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TYPE

Number Filed
Amount Claimed

Corporate

Individual

Totals

1146

7670

8816

$2,855,993,212

$490,413,058

$3,346,406,271

----- 1710 ------

Dismissed/
Number Denied

248

947

1195

Amount Denied

$1,277,494,373

$269,363,329

$1,546,857,702

Number Awarded

898

5013

5911

Amount Awarded

$1,578,498,839

$221,049,729

$1,799,548,568

Table 2 Final Statistical Report on Cuban Claims Program . Source. Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission, Foreign Claims Settlement Com mission 1972 Annual Report.
(W ashington, D .C .: G PO, 1973), 412.
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nationalization in several countries, including Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and
Poland. The Com m ission's task in the Cuban case was to ascertain the amount o f each
claim and deliver to the Executive branch a report on com pensation owed by the Cuban
government, as illustrated in Table 2.41 T he FCSC review did not result in an actual
transfer o f U .S. governm ent funds to private investors as compensation, but rather,
provided the State D epartm ent with an official lump sum which it could in turn present
to the Cuban government a t a future date if the two governments were ever to resume
official communication.
M ore recently, the United States moved again to pressure the Castro
government. After a February 1996 incident in which the Cuban military shot down
two civilian planes belonging to the anti-Castro Brothers to the Rescue movement,
Congress responded in early March by passing the Helms-Burton Act, which enables
U.S. claimants to sue foreign companies to obtain com pensation for their seized
assets.42 It remains to be seen whether any U .S. claimants will actually be

4IThe FCSC tallied 5,911 outstanding claims totaling $1,799,548. 568. not
including interest. W hile a few o f the larger corporations have since recouped their
losses through tax w rite-offs, several thousand claims rem ain uncompensated. For
more information, see. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Claims o f U .S . Nationals Against the
Government o f Cuba. 88th C ong., 2d sess., 28, 29 July and 4 August 1964, 1-14, 121:
and Kirby Jones. "The Issue o f Claims as Seen by the United States," in Subject to
Solution: Problems in Cuban-U.S. Relations, ed. W ayne S. Smith and Esteban Morales
Dominguez (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), 70.
42C arla Anne Robbins and Jose de Cordoba, “C linton backs Bill to Tighten
Cuba E m bargo,” Wall Street Journal. 29 February 1996, p. A3: Anthony DePalma,
“New U .S. Curbs Sound Alarm for Cuba Investors,” New York Tim es. 6 April 1996.
p. A3: and Anne Swardson. “ Allies Irked by Bill to D eter their Trade with U.S.
Foes,” W ashington Post. 7 March 1996. p. A20.
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compensated under this new policy, but the measure demonstrates that this sensitive
chapter in U .S.-Cuban relations is far from over.

Conclusion
The Eisenhower adm inistration's Cold W ar fears over the spread o f communism
within the hemisphere influenced State Department policy toward Guatem ala and Cuba
more than the U .S. property seizures. The Guatemalan case clearly illustrates this
because o f the minimal value o f property loss. This was particularly clear in the
Guatemalan dispute w here the dollar amount in question was minuscule. The
Department certainly w ould not have risked international uproar and potential
estrangement o f Latin A m erican allies stemming from discovery o f U .S. involvement
in a coup designed solely to restore United Fruit property. The company did, however,
heighten tension by providing seemingly irrefutable evidence o f G uatem ala's
communist orientation. T he State Department’s quandary over Cuba was more
complex. State Departm ent officials were cautious initially, not knowing w hat to
expect from the Revolution. As the dispute reached the crisis stage, the Department
realized that its options w ere either to continue watching passively as Castro enacted his
reform programs, in order to preserve diplomatic relations, o r to risk confrontation in
hopes of causing an uprising that would replace Castro with a more agreeable
government. While rem aining conciliatory might have preserved bilateral relations.
W ashington's actions revealed the general consensus among State D epartm ent and other
Administration officials that the United States had a better chance o f returning to the
status quo ante by opposing Castro. In pursuing confrontation, the U.S. government
greatly underestimated C astro and the strength and determination of his following.
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To further its aims, the State D epartm ent used economic and political pressure
during both disputes. Against Guatemala, the United States upheld an embargo on
military assistance, gradually curtailed econom ic assistance, and attacked the Arbenz
government indirectly at the Tenth Inter-Am erican Conference. A fter Arbenz's
overthrow, the Department rewarded President A rm as' pro-U .S. policies with large
bilateral assistance packages. Against Cuba, the United States not only withdrew
economic assistance, but also dismantled the sugar quota, which it hoped would hurt
the country's m ost vital export. U .S. actions against Guatemala helped to destabilize
the government, while its actions against Cuba only served to expedite estrangement
and gravitation toward the Soviet bloc. Political conditions in C uba precluded a
successful repeat o f earlier events in Guatemala.
The State Department did nothing extraordinary in either property seizure
dispute. It debated few technical o r legal issues, and neither controversy actually
proceeded to the negotiating stage, where the State Department would normally have
provided assistance to encourage continued dialogue and a prom pt settling of
differences. The Department acted in both seizures to forward diplom atic notes o f
protest to its foreign counterparts.
The State Department did, however, file formal claims against both countries.
In April 1954, it filed a formal claim against Guatem ala for nearly $7 million plus
$8,700,000 in severance damages. Official D epartm ent involvement came only one
year after the Arbenz expropriation announcem ent. The United States also compiled a
list o f outstanding claims against Cuba, totaling S l.8 billion, not including interest, but
long after diplomatic ties had been severed. M ore than three decades later, the U.S.
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government moved again to pressure Cuba with the Helms-burton Act, which allows
U.S. claimants to sue foreign companies that presently own their form er properties. It
is at present too early to tell what political and com m ercial impact this measure will
have on Cuba. Should diplomatic relations be restored, it is unlikely that any
remaining claims will ever be repaid by a future C uban government, which
undoubtedly will be hard-pressed economically. Instead, the Department will probably
maneuver around the compensation issue, explaining the overriding importance of
encouraging democracy and liberalized trade and investment policies in Cuba.
Fundamentally, the Cold W ar property disputes were poor examples o f how
such crises should be handled. The D epartm ent's experience in Cuba, and to a lesser
extent in Guatemala, would lead to a revised overall policy toward Latin America
under Presidents Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, and the creation of legislation designed
specifically to combat future property seizures.
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CHAPTER V
POST-CUBAN COLD WAR SEIZURES:
PERU AND CHILE
U.S. policies toward the issues o f developm ent and protection o f private sector
investment in Latin A m erica underw ent revision in the aftermath o f the Cuban
experience. On the developm ent side, the Kennedy administration initiated a new
outlook by pledging a decade o f increased U .S. economic assistance to the region under
the Alliance for Progress program , w hich prom oted both economic and social
improvements and the emergence o f stable democratic governments throughout Latin
America. Meanwhile, the Legislative branch altered mechanisms for protecting private
property. Early in the decade, the U .S . Congress took its first step by implementing
legislation requiring mandatory, tim e-sensitive Executive branch retaliation against
uncompensated property seizures. T ow ard the end o f the decade, Congress moved
again to protect U .S.-ow ned property by creating a mixed public-private sector
corporation that would insure investments in developing regions.
These new mechanisms for encouraging development and discouraging
disruptions of free enterprise influenced the State Departm ent’s response to property
seizures that began in 1968 in Peru and 1970 in Chile. The Department's challenge in
the post-Cuba era would be to protect private investment from pervasive Latin
American nationalism and avoid another socialist revolution.

Peru
Between 1968 and 1974, P eru ’s military governm ent initiated a national
development program which involved seizing dozens o f domestically and foreign-
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owned enterprises in the extractive, banking, and agricultural sectors, as well as several
public utilities. The government came to term s with most o f the seized enterprises.
The most contentious and widely publicized o f the unsettled disputes was the 1968-69
seizure o f the International Petroleum C om pany (IPC), a subsidiary o f the Standard Oil
Company o f New Jersey. The IPC issue gained notoriety because o f the long history
o f the dispute, the dollar amount involved, the importance o f the company, and the fact
that Peru refused to compensate the com pany for its losses. The dispute dominated
U .S.-Peruvian relations over the next five years.

Background
Shortly after toppling the civilian governm ent o f President Fernando Belaunde
T erry (1963-1968) in October 1968, the m ilitary junta o f General Juan Velasco
Alvarado (1968-1975) targeted IP C ’s holdings in Peru, claiming that IPC had "unjustly
enriched" itself over nearly a quarter century at the expense o f the Peruvian people.
The junta seized IPC 's La Brea y Parinas oilfields and Talara industrial complex
immediately, and a few months later took its remaining assets. The military
government calculated IPC's indebtedness from 1924 through 1968 at $690.5 million
for crude oil extracted under an invalid title and tax arrangem ent, and demanded that
the company pay this sum before Peru w ould consider compensation for seized assets.1
President Velasco seized IP C 's assets to settle a controversy that had plagued
previous Peruvian governments. The dispute stemmed from IPC's claim to subsoil

lBruce A. Blornstrom and W. Bowman Cutler, "The Foreign Private Sector in
Peru." in U.S. Foreign Policy and Peru, ed. Daniel A. Sharp (Austin: Institute o f Latin
American Studies. 1972), 260.
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rights for the La Brea y Parinas oilfields. The subsoil title to La Brea y Parinas, which
originally served as a pitch mine, was sold b y the state to a Peruvian national in 1826
as part o f the state's program to finance enorm ous debts incurred in fighting for its
1821 independence from Spain. The governm ent approved the title transfer despite a
provision in Peru's 1823 Constitution upholding the colonial-era principle that private
citizens could only extract subsoil resources under concession status. La Brea y Parinas
was later purchased by British investors in 1888, and extensive petroleum production
began soon thereafter. This arrangement still stood when IPC, then a subsidiary o f
Canada's Imperial Oil Company, purchased the La Brea y Parinas properties from its
British owners in 1924. The Imperial Oil Com pany was later acquired by the Standard
Oil Company o f New Jersey.2 Since the claim to subsoil ownership was never
overruled, IPC maintained the unique status (which could not be claimed by any other
private parties) o f holding a title to Peru’s subsoil resources.
By the mid-1950s, increased public criticism prompted company officials to
resolve the situation. They proposed in 1957 that President Manuel Prado Ugarteche
exchange the subsidiary's claim o f subsoil ow nership to La Brea y Parinas for
concession status. As part o f the exchange, IPC requested several commercial benefits
to enhance its business activities in Peru. T he governm ent, however, rejected the

2John E. Huerta, "Peruvian Nationalizations and the Peruvian-American
Compensation Agreements," New York U niversity Journal o f International Law and
Politics 10, no. 1 (Spring 1977): 10-11; Peru, "Origin o f the 'L a Brea y Parinas
P roperty,'” La Brea v Parinas Controversy. (Lima: Government o f Peru, no date
given), vol. 1: exhibits 1, 14; and Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, Peruvian Democracy Under
Economic Stress: An Account o f the Belaunde Administration. 1963-1968. (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1977), 110-17.
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proposal, stating it should not have to confer further privileges for property that was
rightfully Peruvian.3 The government's reaction reflected domestic opinion that the
IPC had long operated illegally in Peru.
The election o f Fernando Belaunde Terry as President in 1963 heralded new
troubles for IPC. His pledge o f extensive agrarian reform , infrastructural
development, an improved education system, and a solution to the IPC case within
ninety days o f assuming office had wide appeal among voters.4 Although he made
gains on most o f these issues, President Belaunde fell far short on his promises.
Belaunde's failure to resolve the IPC controversy marred his presidency.
Instead o f reaching a solution within 90 days, negotiations continued sporadically for
two years, before reaching an eventual stalemate in 1966. The State Department, in
turn, showed displeasure with Belaunde's threats toward foreign-owned property by
withholding development loans needed for public works projects. Moreover, currency
devaluation and a rash o f strikes hampered domestic production and economic growth
by 1966, and Belaunde's agrarian reform measures encountered staunch opposition
from the legislature and wealthy landowners. His position deteriorated further when
the United States withdrew military assistance in 1966 over his decision to purchase
French Mirage fighter aircraft after the United States had refused to sell U.S. planes to

3Jessica Pernitz Einhorn. Expropriation Politics. (Lexington: Lexington Books.
1974), 13; Kucyznksi, 117.
4For further information on Belaunde's reform measures, see, Kuczynski. 4870.
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Peru.5 This combination o f factors sparked strong criticism from Peru's military
toward the civilian government and, ultimately, contributed to its downfall.
Realizing that domestic and external pressures were taking a toll on the nation,
Belaunde executed a last-ditch effort to resolve the IPC controversy in m id-1968. He
had several reasons for urgency. First, on 20 June, the Peruvian Congress had granted
him a 60-day period during which he could enact emergency economic measures,
exempt from legislative review, to resolve the dom estic financial crisis. Second, he
understood that full U.S. economic assistance w ould not resume until he settled the IPC
issue.6 W hile both the public and press had grow n extremely critical o f IPC by this
stage, Belaunde apparently believed that the long-term benefits o f resolving the
controversy (which would undoubtedly require concessions by Peru) outweighed any
short-term criticism he might encounter.
After several weeks o f intense negotiations, Belaunde presented the nation with
the Act o f Talara, a series o f agreements to settle permanently the La Brea y Parinas
controversy. The principal docum ent declared that the La Brea y Parinas oilfields
henceforth belonged to the state (to be operated by the state-owned Empresa Petrolera
Fiscal), canceled all debts claimed to have been owed Peru by the IPC, legitimized
IPC 's other operations in Peru, and granted the company permission to expand the

5Jorge Avendano Valdes and Domingo G arcia Belaunde, "Peru,'' in
Expropriation in the Americas: A Comparative Law Study, ed. Andreas F. Lowenfeld
(New York, Dunellen, 1971) 190; and Charles T . Goodsell, "Diplomatic Protection of
U.S. Business in Peru," in U.S. Foreign Policy and Peru, ed. Daniel A. Sharp (Austin:
University o f Texas Press, 1972), 248-49.
6Kuczynski. 260-63.
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Talara refinery. A second document detailed the future price for IPC's purchase o f
natural gas from Empresa Petrolera Fiscal (E PF), while a third explained the rates at
which it would purchase crude oil.7 To B elaunde's surprise, this did not end the
controversy.
Rather than settle the issue, the A ct o f Talara stirred up more trouble. Carlos
Loret de M ola, who had directly participated in the IPC negotiations as head o f EPF,
declared on 10 September that the final page o f the IPC crude oil purchasing
agreem ent was missing from the official text. According to Loret de Mola, the final
page contained the calculations for the purchase o f crude oil. While the existence of
this missing page was never determined, the calculations it allegedly contained were
already part o f the agreement itself. N evertheless, Loret de M ola's accusations alerted
observers who had not carefully read the agreem ent to the fact that IPC had been given
very favorable rates, and many came to believe that Belaunde had rushed to resolve the
IPC issue during the two-month congressional grant o f extraordinary powers to
circum vent congressional review.8 No am ount o f explaining would satisfy those who
had long opposed the continued existence o f IPC , including military leaders.
On 3 October 1968, nearly one m onth after the "missing page" controversy
began, the Peruvian military toppled the Belaunde government. This military junta was

7American Society of International Law. "Documents and Legislation
Concerning Expropriation o f La Brea and Parinas Oilfields in Peru, 1922-1968,"
International Legal Materials 7. no. 6 (N ovem ber 1968): 1217-54.
8For an explanation o f the calculations, see. "No se Encuentra Original del
Contrato Celebrado Entre EPF-IPC Peru la Copia Tiene V alor Legal Sostienen
M inistros," El Comercio (Santiago) 15 Septem ber 1968, 4: and Kuczynski, 260-263.
266-272.
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unlike any past Peruvian military government. Its progressive, nationalistic, and
reform-minded leaders sought to reduce foreign economic dependence, distribute
national wealth more equitably, and dismantle the governm ent institutions which it
believed were responsible for the nation's current economic crisis. As part o f that plan
they immediately took on the IPC issue. Junta leader General Juan Velasco Alvarado
voided the Act o f Talara, nationalized IP C ’s La Brea y Parinas oilfields and Talara
refinery, and later nationalized its remaining assets while simultaneously charging the
subsidiary $690.5 m illion for profits accrued through unjust enrichment, plus nearly
$15 million for profits received from petroleum production between October and
December 1968.9
IPC immediately worked through Peru's legal system to have the debt claims
overturned and to obtain compensation for the seized property. Company executives
met w ith Peruvian officials through early spring 1969, but were unable to sway them
on the debt issue. M eanwhile, the Peruvian government conducted its own valuation o f
the La Brea y Parinas properties and determined they were worth $71 million, an
amount to be deducted from Peru’s $690.5 million claim .10 The IPC claimed that this

’W hile the IPC dispute certainly was a chief cause for the overthrow, the
military also had other motivations. Prim arily, it had lost confidence in the ability o f
Belaunde, and civilian governments in general, to implement needed economic and
political reforms. Furthermore, the traditionally anti-military American Popular
Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) party seemed likely to take power in national elections
slated for June 1969. Therefore, October 1968 seemed a wise time for military
intervention. Ingram, 61; James D. Rudolph, Peru: Evolution of a Crisis. (Westport:
Praeger Publishers, 1992), 53-64; and Peru, La Brea y Parinas Controversy, vol. II:
exhibits 60 and 62.
loCongress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Relations
with Peru. 91st C ong.. 1st sess., 14, 16 and 17 April 1969, p. 104; and George
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proposal hardly constituted compensation and submitted its ow n valuation figures, as
shown in Table 3. The central issue that concerned IPC was w hether Peru would stand
firm on the unjust enrichment issue.
From the start Velasco tried to isolate the IPC from o th er seizures. Between
1968 and 1974, Peru nationalized dozens o f enterprises in the agricultural, banking,
mining, and public utility sectors, many o f which were U .S.-ow ned. While m ost U.S.
investors were compensated by the Peruvian government, several had difficulty
agreeing upon a compensation figure. Meanwhile, Velasco repeatedly assured the
international community that the uncompensated IPC seizure was a justifiable, isolated
action. He added that Peru welcomed continued foreign investment, if subordinated to
domestic econom ic considerations. In fact, even after deducting the generous sums
awarded as compensation to expropriated foreign-owned enterprises, Peru still netted
over $400 million in new foreign direct investment between 1968 and 1975."
Nevertheless, the IPC seizure came to dominate U .S.-Peruvian relations in the Nixon
administration.

Jackson Eder, "Hickenlooper and Hereafter," The International Lawyer 4. no. 4 (July
1970): 619.
"T h e Peruvian governm ent’s strategy over the next six years was to direct
foreign investment away from vital sectors, such as agriculture, banking, and public
utilities, and into lagging sectors, such as manufacturing. Belco, Marcona M ining, the
Southern Peru Copper Corporation, Occidental Petroleum, and other influential U.S.
companies felt comfortable with arrangements under Velasco and continued to invest
capital in new projects in Peru. Huerta, 33-34: Rudolf, 56: Ingram , 81; and Edmund
Valpy Knox FitzGerald, The Political Economy o f Peru. 1956-78: Economic
Development and the Restructuring o f Capital. (Cambridge: Cam bridge University
Press, 1979), 45.
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Item

Value
(in millions)

La Brea y Parinas producing a s s e ts ..........................................................................

$80

Talara refinery/industrial c o m p le x ..........................................................................

$40

Subtotal..................................................................................................... $120
Lima concessions producing assets (estimated v a lu e ) ...........................................

$50

M arketing and distribution system (estimated v a l u e ) ..........................................

$20

Grand total ............................................................................................. $190

Table 3 Standard O il's Valuation o f Properties Seized by Peru. Source: Congress,
Senate, United States Relations with Peru. 111.
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The State Department Response
The State Department used bilateral assistance to pressure Peru on the IPC
dispute throughout Belaunde’s term. President Lyndon Johnson's Assistant Secretary
o f State for Latin America, Thomas C. Mann, opted to curtail bilateral assistance to
Peru in 1964. By late 1965, the State Department realized that its policies had failed to
resolve the controversy or further the goals o f the Alliance for Progress. When
Lincoln G ordon replaced M ann as Assistant Secretary in early 1966, he reversed U .S.
policy. The State Department halted bilateral aid again in 1967 over the Mirage
dispute.12 In all, vacillating U .S. bilateral assistance failed to expedite a solution.
The State Department had an even greater mix o f opinions about Peru's new
military governm ent. W hile the Department sympathized with the ju n ta's objectives of
building a self-sufficient, progressive economy, it opposed the means by which the
military had seized control, and its assault on foreign-owned property. The
Department expressed displeasure by withholding diplomatic recognition for nearly one
month, and after resuming official ties. Assistant Secretary Covey Oliver instructed
U.S. Ambassador John W. Jones to call upon Peru's Foreign M inister to acknowledge
Peru's right to expropriate IPC property, so long as it provided the company just
com pensation.13 Aside from these activities, the State Department left the burden o f
the IPC dispute to the incoming Nixon administration.

I2Einhorn. 19; and Ingram , 50-52.
13Department o f State, "U.S. Policy Toward Governments o f Peru, 1822 Present: Questions of Recognition and Diplomatic Relations." State Department
Bulletin 71. no. 1947 (18 November 1974): 698: and Einhorn. 36.
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Punitive measures designed by the U.S. Congress to deter uncompensated
seizures made the IPC controversy President N ixon's first regional problem when he
assumed office in January 1969. These measures were the 1962 Hickenlooper
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act o f 1961 and the Hoeven Amendment to the
Sugar Act o f 1948. The Hickenlooper Amendment was created in the aftermath o f
nationalizations in Cuba, Brazil, and Ceylon, and required the President to suspend
assistance to any nation that nationalized or expropriated U .S. property without
reasonable steps toward providing just compensation within six months. The 1962
Hoeven Amendment was also motivated by property seizures o f the early 1960s and
required that the President suspend the sugar quota for nations that failed to compensate
for seized U .S. properties, while simultaneously authorizing the President to levy a tax
on subsequent sugar imports to recompense U.S. claimants. Alteration o f the sugar
quota posed the greatest threat to Peru, since its sugar sales to the United States in 1968
constituted seven percent o f its total exports. Removal o f the quota would cost Peru at
least $45 million in the first year alone, while implementation o f the Hickenlooper
Amendment would result in an additional $34 to S37 million loss.14 Together, these
laws threatened to have an enormous impact on the Peruvian controversy.
The State Department policy-makers in charge o f the Peruvian dispute opposed
the sanctions for numerous reasons. First, they believed that reducing or terminating
Peru's sugar quota under the Hoeven Amendment would not just harm Peruvian

l4For the full text of the Hickenlooper Amendment see, Foreign Assistance Act
o f 1962. am ended. U.S. Code. Title 22. sec. 2370(e)(1) (19701. For the Hoeven
Amendment see. Sugar Act Amendments. Statutes at Large. 85, sec. 17, 408 (1971).
Einhorn. 24-25.
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producers, but also U .S.-ow ned enterprises, which com prised approximately 25 percent
o f Peru's sugar producing industry. Second, more than 250 U .S. companies currently
operated in Peru, with assets worth between $600 and $700 million. Their investments
might also be affected if Peru chose to retaliate against U .S . sanctions. Third, the
pressure o f formal sanctions could radicalize Peru's new m ilitary governm ent.15
Fourth, Standard Oil had not lobbied either the A dm inistration or the U.S. Congress
for implementation o f sanctions. Fifth, the U .S. Congress had not demanded that
sanctions be enforced against Peru (presumably due to the lack o f pressure from the
private sector). Sixth, given the numerous international crises already confronting the
United States in Southeast Asia, a dispute with Latin A m erican neighbors was to be
avoided at all cost.
In addition, the State Department maintained a dislike for these
Congressionally-mandated constraints on both the time period and form o f response.
Years earlier, under President Kennedy, Department officials had testified that such
disputes could best be handled through a policy o f flexible response, while cautioning
that hard-line policies could raise nationalist tendencies and actually hamper

I5The C IA 's Office o f National Estimates concurred w ith the State Department’s
assessment o f the potential impact o f formal sanctions. C ongress, Senate, United
States Relations with Peru. 127; Department o f Com m erce, Survey o f Current
Business 50. no. 10 (October 1970): 28.; W .E. Kuhn, "The Hickenlooper Amendment
as a Determinant o f the Outcome of Expropriation D isputes." The Social Science
Journal 14, no. 1 (January 1977): 75; and Einhorn. 53.
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negotiations, as policy makers believed could now happen in P eru .16 Despite
Department opposition to sanctions, the laws could not be ignored.
The Department hoped to postpone sanctions on the grounds that Peru was
taking "appropriate steps" (as required in both the Hickenlooper and Hoeven
amendments) toward resolving the controversy. To ensure that such steps were taken
required official diplomatic involvement, since the IPC's appeal through Peru's legal
channels had failed. The State Department decided to send a high-level U.S.
representative to negotiate. U .S. Ambassador to Peru John W . Jones was not selected
to lead the talks since he had acquired a reputation during his six years as Ambassador
for being closely connected to IPC executives and former President Belaunde. Instead,
the Department settled on John Irwin III, a Wall Street lawyer who had earlier served
as Assistant Secretary o f Defense (1958-1960) and had helped negotiate a new Panama
Canal Treaty (1965-1967). The White House made its official announcement on 11
March, and the State Department gave him an open-ended agenda, using IPC's
valuation o f its assets as the basis for negotiations.17 The Administration, in truth,
doubted initial negotiations would lead to a compromise, but the mission at least bought
the White House time and provided a pretense for deferring sanctions..

I6Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Expropriation o f Americanowned Property by Foreign Governments in the Twentieth C entury. 26-27; and Charles
Lipson, Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign -CapitaLin.the Nineteenth, and Twentieth
Centuries. (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1985), 210-13.
17President, Statement, "Special Emissary to Peru," W eekly Compilation o f
Presidential Documents 5. no. 11 (17 March 1969): 395; H uerta. 13-14: and Einhorn.
42, 44-45.
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The initial talks were merely exploratory. Irwin conducted nearly three weeks
o f negotiations in Peru with government officials, including President Velasco. Talks
ended in early April 1969 with little progress, but Irwin announced that he would
resume negotiations after consulting with U .S . officials. In the final week before the 9
April deadline for sanctions, Irwin briefed both top State Department policy-m akers
and President Nixon on the IPC dispute. A fter careful review , Secretary o f State
William Rogers announced on 7 April that the United States would postpone sanctions
at least until August, citing continued talks between Irwin and Peruvian officials and
Peru's prom ise to conduct an "administrative review" o f the IPC dispute, scheduled for
completion on 6 August 1969.18 Both actions, from the State D epartm ent's view,
constituted appropriate steps toward resolution, thereby making punitive action
unnecessary.
Although the State Department had managed to justify temporary deferral of
official sanctions, it realized that the move provided only a temporary respite. The
U .S. Congress supported the Departm ent's efforts to negotiate and its policy o f flexible
response, b u t reserved the power to reverse its position if the climate for U .S . investors
deteriorated o r the Department failed to m ake progress. To alleviate these concerns,
the Administration coupled the negotiations with the silent curtailment o f bilateral and
multilateral economic assistance to Peru, following unofficially the dictates o f the
Hickenlooper Amendment.

I8Einhorn, 48: and Congress, Senate. United States Relations with P eru. 119.
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The State Department had several means for applying bilateral economic
pressure to Peru. They included cutting future Agency fo r International Development
(AID) and other foreign assistance program s. Also, an unrelated dispute over Peru's
firing upon and seizure o f U .S. fishing vessels, within Peru's recognized 200 mile
territorial w aters, had already caused the State D epartm ent to suspend m ilitary sales in
February 1969.19 The trend in bilateral assistance during this period is illustrated in
Figure 3.
M ore so than in previous disputes, the Treasury Department played an active
role in pressuring Peru economically. Treasury officials represented the United States
before the multilateral lending institutions, and from its vantage point, voted against
multilateral assistance on the grounds that Peru had proven itself uncreditworthy.
Treasury began its policy under President Johnson in late 1968, shortly after the
military coup, and maintained this course under President Nixon's Treasury Secretary
David Kennedy.20 The Treasury Department needed no cue or formal legislation to
pursue these policies, and it did so strictly on the basis o f protecting U .S. economic
interests, with little regard for the long-term impact on diplomatic relations between the
two countries. T reasury's greater willingness to take a hard-line approach in defense of
U.S. economic interests would later become a prim ary factor in the U .S. Congress'

19The decision to suspend military assistance through the Pelley Amendment was
not made public until May 1969 so as not to endanger the Irwin negotiations. Einhorn.
39.
20Ibid., 37-38.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

96

(in millions of dollars)

100
80
60
40

20

0
j1

9 6 2 j 1963 j 1964 j 1965 j 1966 j 1 9 6 7 i 1968 i 1 9 6 9 1 1970 i 1 9 7 1 1 1972 i 1973 i 1974 i 1 3 7 5 11976

Economic Loans

IH |46.8 i 1.5 i 3 9 .0 1 8.0 j 21.9! 17.5

Economic Grants

□ ! 12.8 i 11.2! 1 5 .7 115.1 i 17.6! 9.8 ! 13.7 13.1 16.9 12.2 16.6 ; 9.0

Military Loans/Grants EH3I20.9 116.5! 9.5 i 12.1 1 10.1 | 5.1

i

i

0.1 : 0.0

I

0 .0 : 3 .0 i2 7 .6 i 0 .0

1 0 .0 . 7.0 111.0
7.3

9.1 10.8

1.5. 0 .5 ! 0 .6 ) 0 .5! 0.9' 0 . 7 ’ 15.9 21.3! 1.1

Figure 3 U.S. Bilateral assistance to Peru, 1962-1976. Source: U.S. AID, U.S.
Overseas Loans and Grants. Series of Yearly Data. Peru tables.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

97
decision to formalize the use o f multilateral sanctions at the height o f the Chilean
controversy, as described in the next section o f this chapter.
The State Department stopped short o f applying further economic pressure on
Peru. W ith curtailment o f bilateral and multilateral assistance under way, the
Department decided not to alter P eru's sugar quota. Apparently, it wanted the Velasco
government to feel pressured by the aid withdrawal, but not to the breaking point. By
combining the Irwin mission with this less confrontational economic approach, the
State Department managed to appease Congressional and private-sector hard-liners who
would otherwise push for formal sanctions.21 This strategy saved the Department from
confrontation that inevitably would have resulted from the formal announcement o f
sanctions.
The Department's approach proved successful at averting demands for further
action. When the August deadline arrived, the W hite House once again deferred
sanctions, this time indefinitely, citing continued talks between Irwin and Peruvian
officials. On 25 August 1969 Irwin returned to Peru for two weeks o f discussions, but
once again failed to reach an understanding. At the same time, there is no indication
that Standard Oil pushed for sanctions against Peru during this period. Perhaps
Standard Oil was satisfied with the silent curtailm ent o f funds, or maybe it believed its
best hope for receiving compensation rested with the State Department’s efforts.
Likewise, nearly a year had passed since the La Brea y Parinas seizures, as had two
deadlines for implementing mandatory sanctions, and Congressional attention toward

2lMartha L. Cottam. Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America.
(Pittsburgh: University o f Pittsburgh Press. 1994). 66-67.
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the dispute had also subsided.22 For the next four years, as Peru expropriated other
U .S.-ow ned properties, and stalled in the IPC negotiations, the United States continued
its policy o f silent economic pressure.
The U .S. policy began to shift in 1973, primarily at the urging o f U .S.
A m bassador Taylor Belcher. Ambassador Belcher, a career Foreign Service O fficer,
had pushed for a more lenient U .S. policy since his arrival in 1969. He gained the
D epartm ent’s full support after Secretary W illiam P. Rogers visited Peru in May 1973.
T he m ilitary leadership's development-oriented objectives impressed Secretary Rogers
and he requested that the Department renew talks with the Peruvian governm ent on all
outstanding claims. M oreover, massive nationalizations in Chile under the M arxist
governm ent o f Salvador Allende overshadowed the Peruvian dispute, and Secretary
Rogers hoped to make clear to Allende the contrast between the Chilean dispute and the
relatively sm aller dispute with Peru.23 To encourage a settlement, the opening o f talks
was coupled with new aid packages.
The Velasco government readily accepted the U.S. offer to resume negotiations,
but a significant problem remained. Peru insisted that IPC 's claims be excluded from
discussion, since the issue had, in its view, been resolved. Thus, the State Department
understood that it would have to develop a creatively-worded settlement that would
som ehow incorporate IPC, yet allow the Peruvian government to deny that the
com pany had been compensated. This responsibility was left to a new special

22Ibid, 57: and Lipson, 302.
^C ongress, House, John Culver. "Renewal of Credits to Peru," Congressional
Record 93rd C ong., 1st sess. (20 September 1973). vol. 119, pt. 24. 30759.
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em issary, James R. Greene, whose August 1973 appointm ent was followed a few
weeks later by U.S. support for a $12.3 million Inter-A m erican Development Bank
(IDB) loan, a $25 million W orld Bank loan, and consideration o f a second $41 million
IDB loan.24 The State Department hoped that these gestures would create a positive
setting for negotiations and flexibility on the part o f Peru toward IPC.
Peru did indeed bend on the IPC issue. After six months and several rounds o f
talks, both countries announced on 19 February 1974 that suitable compensation figures
had been agreed upon for the companies that Peru recognized as having valid
outstanding claims. An annex to the final agreem ent specified the affected companies,
and IPC, o f course, was not on the list. M eanwhile, the agreem ent called for Peru to
deliver a lump sum payment o f $76 million to cover those claim s, while leaving the
actual distribution of those funds to the U .S. governm ent's discretion.25 Such wording
enabled the State Department to acknowledge Peru's intended recipients o f
com pensation and at the same time use over $22 million from the settlement to
com pensate Standard Oil.
The State Department approach to the Peruvian settlem ent revealed that
innovative approaches to resolve disputes touching sensitive issues of national pride and

24Department o f State, "United States and Peru H old Investment Discussions,"
State Departm ent Bulletin 69, no. 1783 (27 August 1973): 310; Huerta, 37-38; and
Congress, House, John Culver, "Renewal o f Credits to P eru," Congressional Record.
30759.
“ Department of State, "U.S. and Peru Reach A greem ent on Certain Investment
Disputes," State Department Bulletin 70, no. 1812 (18 M arch 1974): 272-73: and
Huerta, 36-39.
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sovereignly did work. In the overlapping Chilean dispute, however, a drastically
different political environment led to a very different ending.

Chile
Despite the State D epartm ent's successful diplom atic settlement o f the Peruvian
controversy, a sim ilar solution could not be found in C hile. President Nixon's
expressed dislike o f Salvador Allende Gossens (1970-1973) led the White House to
formulate confrontational economic and political policies toward Chile. These actions
added to the international and internal pressures that ultim ately led to Allende's
downfall. Meanwhile, new actors, new policies, and new legislation emerged from the
Chilean experience, which affected the way in which the State Department handled
property seizure disputes.

Background
For the six years preceding A llende’s 1970 victory, Chile was governed by
Eduardo Frei Montalva. leader o f the centrist Christian D em ocrat party. Frei was
highly regarded by Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon for his liberal trade
and investment policies, coupled with a moderate program o f social and economic
development. They responded to F rei's approach by forwarding greater per capita
Alliance for Progress assistance to Chile than to any other nation in the hemisphere
during this period.26
Allende's program differed from F rei's in degree. Frei had begun popular
programs o f agrarian reform and wealth redistribution, and had initiated a

26Nathaniel Davis, The Last Two Years o f Salvador Allende. (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1985). 3.
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"Chileanization" program to capture greater domestic control over C h ile's vital copper
industry. Allende's Popular Unity party (a coalition o f Chile's Com munist, Socialist
and other left-wing parties), however, called for radical redistribution o f land and
wealth. He initiated agrarian reform and complete government control o f vital
industries.27 W hile Frei had laid the groundwork for these reforms, his programs paled
in comparison to the size and pace promised by Allende.
Both wealthy nationals and foreign investors feared the proposed nationalization
program . Allende's plan singled-out the foreign-dominated copper industry, the
nation’s financial institutions, large landholdings, public utilities, and numerous
manufacturing enterprises as early targets for seizure.28 Several o f these industries
were domestically controlled, such as large landholdings and the textile industry, but it
was clear from the beginning that foreign-owned (predominantly U .S.-ow ned)
investments would also be greatly affected by the new government's plans.
Given the large number o f seizures enacted by the Allende government, they
must be described in broader terms. The seizures generally took one o f three forms:
administrative takeover, purchasing arrangem ent (often under duress), or
nationalization. U.S.-owned property was first seized in mid-November, less than
three weeks after A llende's inauguration, when the Chilean government took over
subsidiaries controlled by the N orthern Indiana Brass Company and Ralston Purina.

27Ibid., 5. Arturo Valenzuela, The Breakdown o f Democratic Regimes: Chile.
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 50.
28Paul E. Sigmund. The Overthrow o f Allende and the Politics o f Chile. 19641976. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh, 1977), 88-90.
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Then, in January 1971, Allende began to nationalize the banking industry (of which
two firms were U .S.-ow ned), reaching eventual settlem ent with the affected companies,
followed by negotiated buyouts and takeovers o f at least two-dozen other U.S.-owned
firms, including Bethlehem Steel's iron producing facilities and the Chilean subsidiaries
o f RCA-Chile and Armco Steel.29 In July 1971 cam e the largest seizures, those o f the
U.S.-ow ned copper subsidiaries, followed by the adm inistrative takeover of
International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) subsidiaries in September 1971.
Meanwhile, thousands o f estates (most o f which w ere Chilean-owned) and dozens o f
manufacturing enterprises were seized throughout A llende's term in office. However,
due to the monetary amount involved and actions taken by the affected companies, the
copper and ITT disputes warranted greatest attention from the State Department.
As stated, Frei had started the process o f nationalizing the copper industry four
years earlier through his "Chileanization" program , which drew upon decades o f
domestic discontent over foreign dominance in C hile's chief export and foreign
exchange earner. Allende him self accurately sum m arized domestic sentiment when he
estimated that the foreign firms had made a t least a $10 billion profit from sixty years
o f mining Chilean copper, while Chile's total accum ulated national wealth over the
previous four centuries had amounted to no m ore than $9.5 billion. In 1965, Frei
raised the state’s share o f ownership in the A naconda Group, Kennecott Copper
Corporation, and Cerro de Pasco Corporation (the three largest U.S.-owned copper

29Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States and Chile
During the Allende Years. 1970-1973: Hearing before the Subcommittee on InterAmerican A ffairs. (Washington, D .C.: GPO 1975), 116-117.
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companies) by gradually increasing Chilean participation, and compensating the copper
companies out o f profits accrued through increased production.30 The arrangem ent was
designed to appease the copper companies and at the same time enable Chile to
continue receiving much needed foreign assistance.
A llende's approach, by contrast, risked confrontation by discarding the Frei
method and moving quickly to nationalize the entire industry. The Chilean Congress
approved an am ended version o f Allende's nationalization proposal in July 1971. The
final bill provided for compensation based on the com pany's declared book value as o f
31 D ecem ber 1970, minus amortization, depreciation, and total "excess profits"
extracted by the companies, to be paid over 30 years at not less than 3 percent annual
interest. The Com ptroller General determined compensation, factoring in the excess
profits calculations that Allende would himself provide. Three months after passage of
the copper nationalization bill, the Comptroller General announced his valuation figures
and A llende's excess profits determination. After combining excess profits with other
book value deductions, the Comptroller General charged that only Cerro de Pasco

^L ouis W iznitzer, "An Interview with C hile's Allende," Christian Science
M onitor. 11 February 1972, 7. John Fleming, "The Nationalization of C hile's Large
Copper Companies in Contemporary Interstate Relations," Villanova I^w Review 18.
no. 4 (M arch 1973): 594-95.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

104
Corporation merited com pensation.31 For Anaconda and Kennecott, calculated excess
profits greatly exceeded valid claims (see Table 4).
Anaconda and Kennecott immediately protested the seizures in Chile and
abroad. They demanded that President Allende make public his calculations for
determining the excess profits figure, which he never did. N ext, they engaged in a
long process o f appealing A llende's ruling, and appeared before the Chilean Special
Copper Tribunal in December 1971. A fter months o f deliberation, the Tribunal
declared that it did not have the power o f judicial review over the excess profits
determination, and later rejected Kennecott's request for a rehearing in September
1972.

In the meantime, Kennecott and Anaconda exerted international pressure, by

mounting an effective campaign to boycott Chilean copper, and by initiating suits in the
United States and Europe to attach C hile's foreign assets.32 Simultaneously, their
W ashington offices lobbied the U.S. governm ent to take a hard-line toward Chile.

3lFor the full-text o f the copper industry nationalization bill, see American
Society o f International Law, "Chile: Constitutional Amendment Concerning Natural
Resources and their Nationalization," International Legal M aterials 10, no. 5
(September 1971): 1067-72; Ingram, 273-75; and Falcoff, 181. For details on the
Comptroller G eneral's final ruling on compensation see, Am erican Society o f
International Law, "Comptroller G eneral's Resolution on the Determination o f
Compensation," International Legal Materials 10, no. 6 (N ovem ber 1971): 1240-53.
32Ingram, 283, 288; Davis, 101. The Special Copper Tribunal was comprised
of a Justice of the Supreme Court (presiding member), a m em ber o f the Appeals Court
o f Santiago, a member o f the Constitutional Tribunal, the President o f the Central Bank
o f Chile, and the National Director o f Internal Revenue. The decision o f the Copper
Tribunal was considered final. American Society o f International Law, "Chile:
Constitutional Amendment Concerning Natural Resources and their Nationalization."
International Legal Materials 1069.
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The September 1971 ITT seizures created equally difficult problems for the
State Department. ITT had possessed over $200 million in assets in Chile by 1971,
including 70 percent ownership o f the Companla de Telefonos de Chile (Chiltelco), and
full ownership o f a telephone directory com pany, a telecommunications equipment
plant, and two hotels. The Allende government had negotiated with ITT for at least six
months on nationalizing Chiltelco and the phone directory company. After losing
patience with IT T 's delaying tactics, Allende took over both subsidiaries in September
1971, but continued with negotiations on com pensation. ITT rejected Chile’s
subsequent offer o f $25 million for the seized properties and later proposal for an
impartial assessment, arguing publicly that Chiltelco alone was worth at least $153
million, while apparently reasoning privately that it would be satisfied with the $92
million due in insurance from the U .S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC). IT T 's strategy backfired, however, upon disclosure in March 1972 that
company executives had channeled covert financial assistance to opposition parties
during the 1970 elections in an effort to thwart an Allende victory. Allende had long
suspected that ITT had worked actively to block his election campaign, and with
revelation o f these allegations, he withdrew his compensation offer. ITT suffered a
further setback in April 1973 when its request for payment on its OPIC insurance
policy was rejected on the basis that the com pany had failed to comply with the non
provocation clause in its insurance contract, thereby harming the U .S. position as a
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successor to the claim.33 Even before Allende enacted his program, however, ITT had
begun to lobby the Executive and Legislative branches for action against Chile.
As the nationalization program proceeded, econom ic and political difficulties
mounted for Allende. Rampant inflation, over $3 billion in loan obligations, capital
flight, and the drop in global copper prices took a toll in 1972. At the same time, his
political coalition, which had been weak from the very beginning, now began to slip
even further. Allende’s Popular Unity party had come into power with a mere 36.6
percent o f the popular vote, compared to 35 percent for the National Party candidate
and 27.8 percent for the Christian Democrat party. By 1972, however, Allende would
also have to contend with independent political actions taken by the m ost radical leftists
(who had different views as to the pace and direction the reforms should take) and a
series o f dam aging strikes.34 The crises fragmented his coalition and destabilized his
government.
Surprisingly, despite A llende’s M arxist-oriented platform, other communist
countries failed to come to his rescue, as they had for Castro one decade earlier.
Within six months o f his inauguration, Allende had reestablished diplomatic and
economic ties with Cuba, most o f the Soviet bloc, and the People's Republic o f China.

33D avis, 69-71; Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson revealed in March 1972
that ITT had supported opposition parties against Allende in the 1970 elections. Jack
Anderson, "M emos Bare ITT Try for Chile C oup,” W ashington Post. 21 March 1972.
B18.
^C ongress, House, United States and Chile During the Allende Years. 19701973 . 68-69, 74-75; Edward Boorstein, An Inside View: Allende's C hile. (New York:
International Publishers, 1977), 187-204; Valenzuela. 61; and Davis, 5, 85-93. 196203.
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During his first two years in office, total aid from the U .S .S .R . ranged between $500600 million, while other W arsaw Pact countries contributed approximately $250
million. Even though bilateral aid from the Soviet bloc massively overshadowed the
$34 million in bilateral assistance forwarded to Chile by the United States during the
same period (over one-half o f which was military assistance), it did not alleviate the
nation's massive econom ic problem s.35 Apparently, the U .S .S .R . concluded that Cuba
was enough o f an econom ic burden, C hile's plight was a low strategic priority,
domestic concerns outweighed its desire to ensure A llende’s success, and emerging
East-W est detente m ade full-fledged support for Chile untenable.
Insurmountable international and domestic difficulties prompted the traditionally
conservative and non-interventionist Chilean military to cut short A llende's Marxist
experiment in Septem ber 1973. In the aftermath o f the 11 September coup, junta
leader General Augusto Pinochet U garte quickly reversed A llende's three years of
initiatives by divesting the governm ent o f its recently acquired assets, compensating
aggrieved former ow ners, encouraging the return o f W estern capital, and re-building
cordial ties with the United States.36 As will be described below, the U .S. contribution
to the climate that brought about this change more closely resembled actions previously
undertaken toward Guatemala two decades earlier than the parallel dispute with Peru.

35U.S. Agency for International Development, U .S. Overseas Loans and Grants
Series o f Yearly Data: Volume II. Latin America and C aribbean. Chile tables.
36Davis, 26.
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The State Department Response
Even though diplomacy failed to resolve the Chilean dispute, the exercise
proved a learning experience for the State Department. The Department w ould have to
contend with a confrontational W hite House agenda toward Chile, pressure from the
private sector and Congress for a hard-line approach, and the involvement o f new U.S.
governm ent actors in shaping foreign policy.
The Nixon W hite House set the U.S. position toward C hile’s Allende. Its
approach was confrontational, largely due to the President's belief that Chile
represented a greater threat to U .S. investment and regional security than Peru.
Allende had demonstrated that it was possible for a Marxist to be elected through
peaceful democratic channels, and he made clear his intention to nationalize large
portions o f the Chilean economy at any cost, bringing him into direct conflict with
U .S. investors.37 The Nixon W hite House feared C hile’s M arxist experim ent, if
successful, might be emulated elsewhere.
The White House had good reason to believe that tough, yet non-overt pressure
could produce results. First, the Allende coalition was very weak, making m any o f its
drastic reforms all the more difficult to implement. Second, U .S. military attaches
operating in Chile enjoyed a long and close relationship with the traditionally
conservative Chilean armed forces, which Allende had neither the strength to control
nor dism antle.38 This relationship enabled U.S. intelligence to monitor the Chilean

37Henry Kissinger, White House Years. (Boston: Little, Brown and Com pany,
1979), 657, 671.
38Davis, 26.
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opposition movement, which in turn allow ed the W hite House to formulate U.S. policy
toward Chile without relying on U .S. diplomats, o r even consulting with Department
officials on covert activities.
The strategy o f confrontation consisted o f covert funding to opposition groups
and economic pressure. Covert assistance was not a new policy in U .S.-C hilean
affairs. During the 1964 elections, the CIA had channeled funds to A llende's
opponents, and it did so again during the 1970 elections, under a program that became
known as Track I. Once Allende assumed power, the funding continued under a course
now termed Track II. White House officials later explained that covert assistance had
continued after A llende's inauguration to ensure survival o f opposition parties until the
1976 Chilean presidential elections. C ritics, how ever, have alleged that covert
assistance sponsored more damaging opposition activities (such as strikes and
propaganda campaigns) in order "destabilize" the Allende government. As for
economic pressure, President Nixon took the advice o f National Security Advisor
Henry Kissinger to pursue a "cool but correct" outw ard policy toward Allende.
Kissinger issued a National Security Decision M emorandum six days after Allende's
inauguration, outlining new policies for putting indirect economic pressure on Chile.
The memorandum instructed the State Department and other U.S. governm ent agencies
with authority over bilateral and multilateral aid not to approve new funding for Chile,
to deny investment guaranty requests, and to assess whether on-going funding programs
could be either reduced or terminated.39 These policies resulted in a sharp decline in

39Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities, Covert Action in Chile. 1963-1973. 94th Cong., 1st
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funding to Chile during the A llende years (see Figure 4), and ultim ately helped to
destabilize the government. W hile unpublicized U .S. economic policies toward Chile
set the tone for U.S.-Chilean econom ic relations, the Nixon adm inistration still had to
develop a policy with regard to Congressionally-mandated sanctions. In the Chilean
dispute, only the Hickenlooper amendm ent applied, since Chile produced virtually no
sugar.
As W hite House political and economic policies unfolded, several o f the most
influential U .S. firms with investments in Chile moved quickly after A llende's victory
to pressure the Executive branch into taking strong action against Chile. An ad hoc
group o f W ashington representatives o f several U .S. firms with subsidiaries in Chile
convened periodically to discuss the situation in Chile and responses they wanted from
the U.S. government to protect their investments. During these meetings, ITT
representatives (the com m ittee's organizers) attempted to persuade other companies to
pressure the Administration to take a hard-line approach toward Chile. ITT predicted
that the State Department would convince the W hite House to avoid implementing the
Hickenlooper amendment and suggested that efforts should instead be focused on the
National Security Council, the W hite House, and sympathetic members o f Congress.

sess., 1975, Committee Print, 6-13; Davis, 5-13, 21-22; Blaiser, 266; and Kissinger.
679-81.
■•"Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Multinational
Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy: Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Multinational Corporations. 93rd C ong., 1st sess., March and April 1973. 629. 79495.
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As ITT had predicted, the State D epartm ent had various reasons to oppose use
o f the Hickenlooper amendment, for several reasons. First, as in the case o f Peru, the
Department feared that the remaining U.S. investments in Chile (valued at over $85
million) would be seized in retaliation. Second, the Department had, for good reasons,
dodged m andatory sanctions in Peru, and a dissim ilar course o f action toward Chile
would trigger allegations o f discrimination. Third, official sanctions would have a
minimal impact on U.S. bilateral assistance and might actually galvanize Chilean
support for Allende. Fourth, during the first two years o f the Allende government,
further avenues o f recourse remained open to U .S. firms, since those companies which
had not received acceptable compensation were either still engaged in some form of
negotiation or appealing such actions through Chilean legal channels. Finally, the
Department feared Chile might retaliate by reneging on $940 in existing loan
obligations to the Export-Import Bank and A ID .41 The Department believed official
use o f sanctions would provoke a crisis, with no foreseeable benefits.
Despite the soft-line State Department position, the Treasury Department, as in
Peru, took a strong stance against multilateral aid and debt negotiations with Chile.
Negative votes by Treasury representatives before the W orld Bank and the IDB meant
that virtually no loans were approved for Chile during the Allende years. Treasury
once again argued that its decision was not political, but economic, because Chile was a
bad credit risk. Later, in April 1972 Paris Club debt renegotiations, the Treasury
Department pressured Chile on compensation by inserting a provision into the final

4,Davis. 73: and Ingram, 308-09.
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agreement prom ising that Chile would provide ju st compensation for seized properties,
and Chile signed it.42 The Treasury Department's actions revealed once again its
ability to influence U.S. policy toward property seizures independent o f the State
Department.
Even though the State Department had justified rejection o f the Hickenlooper
amendment, public and private pressure for formal action mounted. As the pace o f
Chilean seizures gained momentum in early 1971, and action against the copper
industry appeared eminent, informal discussion began in mid-spring 1971 between the
under secretaries and assistant secretaries o f Com m erce, State and Treasury as to the
appropriate official response. The meetings expanded into a formal inter-agency
review in July, at President N ixon's request. O ver the following months, officials
from all three departments, OPIC, the National Security Council, and the White House
worked on clarifying the Administration's position toward property seizures, long-term
strategies for safeguarding U.S. foreign investment and developing a U.S. government
response plan for future seizures.43
Six months later, on 19 January 1972, President Nixon publicly announced the
Administration's policy on uncompensated seizures. It was the first time the Executive

42Davis, 76-77. The Paris Club is comprised o f the leading W estern
industrialized countries, and provides a procedure whereby debtor governments can
negotiate with creditor governments to lighten debt obligations or acquire new
financing. For m ore information, see, Alex Rieffel, The Role o f the Paris Club in
M anaging Debt Problem s. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 2-10.
43Mark L. Chadwin, "Foreign Policy Report/N ixon's Expropriation Policy
Seeks to Soothe Angry Congress," National Journal 4, no. 4 (22 January 1972): 148153.
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branch ever delineated actions it would take to com bat this problem. Nixon declared
that the United States would reject new bilateral loans and oppose multilateral aid for
seizures unaccompanied by compensation. To further pacify critics, N ixon announced
that a permanent inter-agency group would coordinate the U .S. response. Officially
established in 1972, the State Departm ent-chaired Inter-Agency Expropriation Group
drew members from the Departments o f C om m erce, Defense, and Treasury, as well as
the National Security Council.44 T he Expropriation Group reported directly to the
W hite House Council on International Economic Policy. As mandated, the
Expropriation Group would continuously review potential and on-going seizure
disputes, determine in each instance whether a seizure had occurred (and if so, whether
efforts were being made to provide ju st com pensation), recommend Administration
action consistent with the President's January 19 policy statement, and coordinate the
implementation o f U .S. policy. The Expropriation Group marked the first formal
mechanism designed to improve inter-agency dialogue and decision-making.
Although Congressional advocates o f stronger Executive response to Chile were
temporarily appeased, the drive for further binding legislation to address future disputes
continued. Congressman Henry Gonzalez (D -TX ) introduced legislation in late 1971
requiring the Treasury Department to vote against multilateral assistance to countries
that enacted uncompensated seizures o f U.S. property, in a manner sim ilar to the

^D epartm ent o f State, "President Nixon Issues Policy Statement on Economic
Assistance," State Department Bulletin 66, no. 1702 (7 February 1972): 152-154. See
also, General Accounting Office, Nationalizations and Expropriations o f U .S. Direct
Private Foreign Investment: Problems and Issues. (Washington: GPO, 1977): 1-8.
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existing requirem ent under the Hickenlooper am endm ent for bilateral assistance.45
Experience had shown that the Treasury Department was more likely to invoke such
measures than the State Department, and would probably do so with or without State’s
concurrence.
W hile the President, his advisors, other departm ents, and Congress struggled to
control and define the Administration's policy tow ard uncompensated seizures. State
Department and U .S. Embassy officials endeavored to maintain normal diplomatic
relations with Chile and to push for a solution to individual property seizure disputes.
Edward M. K orry, who had worked as U .S. Ambassador to Chile since October 1967,
continued at his post through the first year o f the Allende government, the period
during which the bulk o f the U.S. property seizures took place. Ambassador K orry’s
efforts focused prim arily on assisting U .S. firms targeted for seizure. For example,
when Allende seized the Northern Indiana Brass C om pany's Chilean subsidiary in
November 1970, the U.S. Embassy urged the Chilean government to offer
compensation, and it made a similar effort on behalf o f Ralston Purina.

In January

1971, the Em bassy moved to defuse potential conflict between the Chilean government
and both Bethlehem Steel and Cerro de Pasco, by asking Chilean officials to negotiate
buyouts.46 A t this early stage, the Chilean governm ent was engaged in buyout

45The provision became known as the Gonzalez Amendment. International
Development Association Act. U .S. C ode. Title 22, sec. 284j (1988). F o r a
legislative history, see. United States-Code-CongressionaLand Administrative News.
(St. Paul: W est Publishing Co., 1972), 2:2017-2021.
‘“ Congress, Senate, Select Com mittee to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence Activities, Intelligence Activities. Senate Resolution 21:
Hearings Before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect
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negotiations with targeted U.S. investors, and left open avenues for recourse. As a
result, the U .S . Embassy did not recommend State D epartm ent interposition on behalf
o f U .S. com panies, or ask for strong notes o f protest.
The U .S. Embassy's involvement intensified during the summer o f 1971 when
the Chilean legislature took up consideration o f A llende's copper nationalization bill.
After the announcement, Ambassador K orry met discreetly with opposition members o f
the Chilean Congress in an effort to soften the blow to the U .S. copper companies. In
the months between passage o f the copper nationalization bill and the Comptroller
G eneral's compensation ruling in September 1971, A mbassador Korry presented
suggestions for compensation, not only for the copper companies, but also for the ITT
Chiltelco takeover. Korry proposed that Chile offer compensation to the copper
companies over a period o f twenty years and to ITT over twelve years, both in the
form o f bonds at a "reasonable" interest rate. The seized U .S. companies would
simultaneously request that OPIC provide a guarantee for the Chilean bonds. The
Ambassador reasoned that the arrangem ent would benefit the U.S. companies by
ensuring compensation for their investments and at the sam e time enable Chile to
continue receiving foreign assistance.47 Despite K orry's efforts, the negotiations failed
to reach a solution.
W ith a lull between crises, the Department deployed its new ambassador to
Chile. Nathaniel Davis, who arrived in Santiago on 13 October 1971. His prior service

to Intelligence Activities. 94th Cong., 1st sess.. vol. 7. 4 and 5 December 1975, 129.
47Congress. Senate, Intelligence Activities. 128-133.
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as Acting Peace Corps D irector to Chile in 1962, extensive service in Eastern Europe,
and most recent service as Ambassador to Guatem ala made him well suited for the job.
A series o f new crises left Davis with a short adjustment period, however. Just before
his arrival, the extrem ely costly ITT seizure had taken place, and Chile's Comptroller
General had announced his final compensation determ ination for the U.S. copper
companies. Secretary o f State Rogers responded publicly to this on 13 October, the
day of Davis' arrival. Rogers noted that the U .S. companies had operated in full
compliance with Chilean law. and he denounced the retroactively-applied excess profits
determination as arbitrary and in violation on international law. He indicated that
Chile's failure to adhere to internationally accepted standards for compensation could
endanger future public and private investment.48 There was nothing more the Embassy
itself could do overtly regarding the copper dispute until the Special Copper Tribunal
issued its ruling.
Internally, the D epartm ent began to prepare for possible bilateral talks as a
fallback measure.

W hen the Tribunal issued its expected ruling against Kennecott and

Anaconda in August 1972, the State Department formally proposed bilateral
negotiations the following month. Through an exchange o f notes, the Chileans agreed,
and four rounds o f talks w ere held between Decem ber 1972 and Allende's overthrow in
September 1973. The closest the two sides cam e to making progress was during the
second session, held in W ashington in March 1973, when the Chilean delegation
proposed that the copper dispute and other outstanding claims be subjected to

48Congress, H ouse, Multinational Corporations and United States Foreign
Policy, 957.
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arbitration under a 1914 treaty o f conciliation and arbitration. U.S. Ambassador
Nathaniel Davis supported this option, but the U .S. delegation instead countered that
the issue should be negotiated bilaterally, as Chile had pledged under Article 4 of the
April 1972 Paris Club accord on debt renegotiation.49 Although the bilateral talks were
merely exploratory, they at least bought the State Department time, thereby diverting
the need for harsher overt measures.
Unlike previous disputes, O PIC played an active role in the Chilean
controversy. The U .S. Congress had established O PIC in 1969 to assume
responsibility for the government-sponsored investment guarantee program which had
been handled by AID since 1949. AID had administered the direct insurance program
as p a n o f the M arshall Plan's Economic Cooperation Act, which included political risk
insurance for U .S. investors in Europe after W orld W ar II. As Europe's need for
assistance diminished during the 1950s, the political risk insurance program had turned
its attention toward developing countries, and continued to do so under OPIC one
decade later. Investors interested in development-oriented business ventures could
apply for OPIC insurance against w ar risk, inconvertibility, and expropriation.50 Thus,

49Congress, House, United States and Chile During the Allende Years. 19701973. 67. Chilean Ambassador to the U .S., O rlando Letelier, headed the first two
talks for Chile, while Jose Toha, form er Minister o f Interior and Defense headed the
final two delegations. On the U .S. side, Assistant Secretary o f State Charles Meyer
chaired the first U .S. delegation, Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
John Crimmins and Treasury Assistant Secretary John Hennessy jointly chaired the
second delegation, and newly-appointed Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Jack Kubisch and Treasury Assistant Secretary Hennessy jointly chaired the final two
talks. Davis, 103-04, 197.
“ Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Overseas Private
Investment Corporation: A Critical Analysis, report prepared by Foreign Affairs
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in the event o f an expropriation, insured investors could file a claim on their investment
policies, and, if awarded, OPIC would then inherit the com pany's form er claim and
proceed to negotiate with the expropriating governm ent.
O P IC 's presence created both advantages and disadvantages for the State
D epartment. W hereas OPIC had not guaranteed loans to companies investing in Peru,
it inherited a number o f AID guarantees for investments in Chile issued during the
more stable days o f the Frei administration. In fact, total O PIC exposure in Chile by
1973 was only exceeded by commitments issued for Jam aica and K orea.51
Expropriation insurance had been issued to at least a dozen companies operating in
Chile, including ITT and the copper companies, and o v er $150 million in claims had
been filed with OPIC for seized assets (see Table 5). T o compound problem s, AID
had issued these guarantees without having first secured a solid Bilateral Investment
Treaty acknowledging the U .S. right to subrogate outstanding claims to the Agency for
negotiation, which AID had usually (but not always) required before backing
investment projects.52 Despite having over-extended itself in Chile, OPIC presented
three advantages for the State Department. First, it served as a buffer between the

Division, Congressional Research Service, 93d C ong., 1st sess., 1973, Committee
Print, 5-13, 17-21.
51Ibid., 54.
“ President Frei had negotiated a Bilateral Investm ent Treaty with the United
States, but reportedly decided not to present the treaty to the Chilean Congress for
ratification because he feared it would be voted dow n. Congress, Senate. Multinational
Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy. 392. For m ore information on subrogation
rights see, Congress, House, The Overseas Private Investm ent Corporation: A Critical
Analysis. 100-103.
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Investor

Amount Paid

A n a c o n d a .................................................................................................................$13,640,000
Bank o f A m e r i c a .................................................................................................... $3,010,272
Bethlehem S t e e l ....................................................................................................... $3,076,820
Cerro C orp................................................................................................................$47,504,034
International Chem. Fibers, Inc............................................................................. $103,000
I T T ............................................................................................................................ $34,706,917
K e n n e c o tt.................................................................................................................$66,900,000
Nibco, Inc...................................................................................................................

$110,000

Ralston Purina Company ......................................................................................

$826,475

T able 5: OPIC Claims Resolved by Cash Settlements and Guarantees. Source: OPIC
30 September 1991 Press Release; Congress, House, United States and Chile During
the Allende Years. 1970-1973 . 73.
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D epartment and the Chilean government, by providing yet another level o f recourse for
U .S. investors. OPIC worked closely with several U .S. firm s in Chile to keep
negotiations going and to obtain just compensation for their seized properties. Second.
OPIC expropriation insurance contracts called for a one-year "cooling-off period" after
a seizure had taken place, during which the U .S. claimant was required to endeavor to
negotiate for com pensation.53 Third, several U .S. companies had received paym ent on
their insurance policies, and others were in the process o f negotiating settlements with
OPIC. Although payment by OPIC would still affect the D epartm ent in the long-term,
since its investment guarantees ultimately were backed by the U .S. Treasury (which
would therefore be burdened with the outstanding claim), O P IC 's presence at least
alleviated part o f the expropriation problem in the short-term , by enabling the State
Department to further justify a delay of sanctions.
State Department and OPIC efforts to press the Allende government for
compensation yielded few results. Most o f the outstanding disputes would be settled
unilaterally by Chile, under the Pinochet-led military junta that deposed Allende.
During Pinochet's first year in office, Chile successfully negotiated dozens o f
agreements with affected U .S. companies, including the U .S. copper producers, for
either compensation or the return of seized properties. O ver 100 other state-owned
enterprises went up for sale (which helped to finance many o f the compensation
awards), open to bidding by both domestic and foreign investors. Anaconda and Cerro
were awarded very favorable compensation, a portion o f which they received in cash

53Congress. House, The Overseas Private Investment Corporation: A Critical
Analysis. 96-100.
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and the bulk through long-term promissory notes.54 In all, the military ju n ta succeeded
in reversing Allende's actions as quickly as they had been enacted.

Conclusion
Although the two Nixon-era seizures overlapped chronologically, they evolved
differently. The Belaunde and Frei were moderate and reform-minded, yet the State
Department pressured Belaunde politically and economically throughout its term
because it repeatedly threatened U.S. foreign investment. At the same tim e, the
Department provided substantial economic and military assistance to the Frei
government because o f its pro-W estern stance and its gradual approach toward
purchasing greater ownership o f the nation’s copper industry. When the Velasco
governm ent seized control in Peru, the Department moved to a conciliatory approach
because o f the junta’s ability to convey its pro-W estern stance and its successful
isolation o f the IPC seizure from other activities. In Chile, however, A llende's
ideological and political orientation concerned the Nixon White House so much that it
took direct control over U.S. decision making and established confrontational economic
and political policies to combat this perceived threat to regional stability.
W ith the A dm inistration's position toward each dispute fairly well established,
the State Department nevertheless had to deal with the possible use o f official sanctions
against property seizures for the first time in Latin America. The D epartm ent's
decision not to use the Hickenlooper and Hoeven amendments against Peru restricted its
range o f options toward Allende. Other Latin American nations would have

^Business International Corporation. Chile After Allende. (New York: Business
International Corporation, 1975), 25-29.
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immediately accused the United States o f discriminatory policies against Allende had
the Department succumbed to private sector and Congressional pressure for formal
retaliatory measures against Chile.
The tim ing o f the State D epartm ent's involvement appeared appropriate in both
disputes, but its level o f effort toward Allende could have been greater. In Peru, the
Department began negotiations early in the crisis to justify postponement of the
Hickenlooper am endm ent, and it made use o f appointed envoys to help break the
stalemate. Early direct involvement in Chile, however, was deemed inappropriate
since the A llende governm ent had, a t least for the first two years, left open some
further avenue o f recourse to which U .S. investors could appeal. W hen the
Department did attem pt to negotiate bilaterally with Chile, it made little progress. The
negotiators, State and Treasury Departm ent Assistant Secretaries, could only devote a
limited am ount o f time given their w ide areas o f responsibility. Apparently,
consideration was not given to appointing a special emissary whose effort would have
been to reach a settlem ent on outstanding claims. This approach, used successfully
toward Peru, was never attempted in Chile.
The bureaucratic framework in which the Department operated had changed
considerably by the close o f the Chilean dispute. On the positive side, the pressure of
the Chilean seizures had forced the Executive branch to establish the Expropriation
Group, to produce a unified response toward future seizures o f U.S. properties abroad.
Also, the presence o f OPIC added a new factor which furthered the Department's aim
o f delaying the use o f sanctions and reducing the need for diplomatic involvement. On
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the negative side, Congressionally imposed punitive m easures further complicated both
disputes and remained as an obstacle for future disputes.
The end result o f the Peruvian and Chilean disputes were ambiguous. Peru
proved a good case study o f the State D epartm ent's handling o f property seizures.
There was one prominent property seizure in dispute, virtually no extra-regional threat,
and a willingness by the Department to employ dedicated private sector negotiators in
order to reach a settlement. The extensive Chilean seizures, in contrast, were poorly
handled by the Department, prim arily because the W hite House set a confrontational
tone early into the dispute, which restricted the D epartm ent’s response options.
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CHAPTER VI
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The six property seizure disputes discussed in this thesis span forty years and
represent a specific regional and institutional focus. This diversity o f case studies
provides an ample framework for analyzing the evolution o f U.S. D epartm ent o f State
responses to seizures over time, w ithin the context o f national and econom ic security
concerns. Additionally, the cases provide guidance as to how the D epartm ent might
avoid pitfalls in the future.
Several generalizations can be drawn from the case studies. First, conciliatory
political approaches led to successful diplomatic outcomes, and confrontational policies
led to failed diplomacy. Second, the State Department based its policy more on
perceived economic and political security threats (i.e ., world war and communism)
than property seizure disputes. T hird, neither the type or size of the property seized,
nor the influence o f the seized com pany, had a noticeable impact on Department
decision making. Fourth, while various forms o f economic pressure w ere applied
throughout every dispute, the tone o f the Departm ent's political response had a greater
effect than any economic measures taken. Fifth, when the State Department did
become directly involved in negotiations, or in assisting claimants, its perform ance was
consistent throughout every dispute.
The cases were evenly split between use o f a conciliatory and confrontational
approach. The State Department used a conciliatory policy toward the small Bolivian
petroleum confiscation, the large M exican petroleum nationalization (over strong
protests from prominent U.S. companies) and the large Peruvian petroleum
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confiscation. AH three cases were resolved through diplomatic channels with existing
governm ents, and U.S. claimants were com pensated for their losses. As a result, the
Bolivian, M exican and Peruvian disputes w ere diplom atic successes. In contrast, the
D epartment ultimately adopted a confrontational approach toward the small Guatemalan
agrarian expropriations and the enormous C uban and Chilean nationalizations.
Diplomatic communications turned antagonistic, and it became impossible to reach
settlements with the existing governments. These three Cold W ar cases therefore were
diplomatic failures.
T he perceived level o f political and (or) economic threat posed by a given Latin
American nation accounts for the political approach adopted by the State Department.
The seizures themselves, meanwhile, were ju st one factor influencing U .S. policy. In
Bolivia and Mexico, for example, the United States did not rush immediately to the aid
o f U.S. oil interests, and adhered instead to President Roosevelt's Good Neighbor
Policy, which advocated non-interference and non-intervention into the affairs o f Latin
American nations. The United States becam e even more conciliatory toward both
countries as involvement in W orld War II loom ed on the horizon, and the need for
hemispheric unity came to overshadow bilateral property disputes. The conciliatory
approach taken toward Peru nearly a quarter century later was governed by Cold W ar
concerns. The Department viewed Velasco as pro-foreign investment, and posing a
low economic or political security threat. T he Peruvian case also afforded the
Department a chance to distinguish between “acceptable” policies and the
“ unacceptable” approach taken by Chile. The Cold W ar likewise colored the
Departm ent’s approach toward Guatemala and C uba, where both countries were
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perceived as potential beachheads for communist expansion. In those cases, the
Department took a hard-line.
Regardless o f whether U .S. policy makers believed they could co-exist with a
particular governm ent, they nevertheless pursued fairly sim ilar economic retaliatory
measures, with no consistent pattern o f success or failure. The State Department
countered all six seizures by silently curtailing bilateral loan and grant assistance. In
Mexico, Peru and Chile, the U .S. Treasury Department became involved. As
requested by State Department hard-liners, the Treasury Department canceled Mexico’s
silver purchasing arrangem ent. Later, in Peru and Chile, it voted against continued
multilateral assistance. In Cuba, President Eisenhower suspended the nation’s sugar
quota. While the silent curtailm ent o f bilateral and multilateral assistance appeared
appropriate and justified, dabbling in commodity-specific retaliatory measures yielded
undesirable results. The U .S. economy, for example, was as much harmed as the
Mexican economy by the silver cancellation, and halting C uba’s sugar quota merely
expedited a break in bilateral diplomatic relations. Given the negative experience o f
these additional measures in Mexico and Cuba, the U .S. government should forego use
of non-conventional sanctions unless it can be ascertained with certainty that the
pressure created will be exclusively unilateral.
The dubious benefit o f economic pressure brings into question the strategy
favored by hard-liners o f imposing mandatory economic sanctions, either as a tool or
deterrence. After the Cuban nationalizations, Congressional hard-liners responded to
public opinion by passing legislation requiring formal mandatory sanctions against
uncompensated seizures, believing these measures would accomplish both objectives.
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while at the same time appeasing constituents who argued that the State Department
would not fight to protect U.S. economic interests unless forced to do so. While not
all State Department decision makers opposed this hard-line approach, the
Departm ent’s consensus was that mandatory formal sanctions were unnecessary, likely
to cause further retaliation, and could potentially harm long-term bilateral and regional
relations. Notwithstanding the unprovable argument o f deterrence, the Department
appeared justified in its position. It curtailed new economic assistance in every dispute.
The Department apparently realized that such high-profile nationalistic political seizures
were irreversible for the existing government, and that formal sanctions would have
been met with yet another formal and hostile response, thereby needlessly harming
diplomatic relations with countries that might otherwise pose little threat to U.S.
political and economic security.
The kind o f property seized, the dollar am ount involved, and the political
influence o f the U .S. companies involved had little impact on State Department policy.
The sectors varied from the oil industry in Bolivia, Mexico and Peru to the agricultural
sector in Guatemala to widespread industrial enterprises and basic infrastructure in
Cuba and Chile. All three oil seizures were political successes, while the agricultural
and large industrial seizures were political failures. The dollar amounts ranged from
small disputes in Bolivia and Guatemala to very large seizures in M exico, Cuba, Peru
and Chile. The Department succeeded politically in the small Bolivian and large
M exican and Peruvian seizures, and failed politically in the small Guatemalan and large
Cuban and Chilean disputes. Also, the U.S. companies involved were all regarded as
very influential and capable of gaining access to U .S. government officials at the
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highest levels. Nevertheless, three failed and three succeeded. The only hint o f a trend
is that the oil seizures were all resolved through diplom acy. This appears to be a false
lead, however, given that the Guatemalan agrarian dispute (in a sector far less strategic
than oil) was m et by confrontation, while the petroleum seizures had been prompted by
irresponsible behavior on behalf o f U .S. oil com panies.
T he State Department used sim ilar mechanisms to defend U.S. interests during
each dispute, regardless o f whether U .S. policy was conciliatory or confrontational.
The Department only interposed officially in each case once the affected companies had
exhausted all local remedies and direct negotiations had collapsed. Official diplomatic
representation only appeared premature in the Guatem alan dispute. Even though a year
passed before the State Department presented an official claim to the Arbenz
governm ent, the dispute was not given ample time to cool off, had the U .S. objective
been to achieve an amicable settlement to the United Fruit Company's claim. This
approach differed significantly from Under Secretary o f State Sumner W elles' earlier
decision not to take formal action against the Bolivian confiscation o f Standard O il’s
subsidiary given the existence of the Calvo Clause, a policy which the United States did
not officially recognize.
While the Department did provide a degree o f assistance to U .S. claimants, it
should have commissioned special envoys more often. Deployment o f special envoys
in Mexico and Peru contributed to a successful resolution. In the highly sensitive
Guatemalan, Cuban and Chilean disputes, how ever, the Department assigned no
envoys, and failure to do so may have contributed to the poor outcomes o f each case.
While it is true that U.S. officials at the assistant secretary level from both the State
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and Treasury Departments did enter negotiations with Chilean officials, the dispute was
only one o f numerous responsibilities, and could only be given limited attention.
Every dispute would have benefitted from the services o f an experienced private sector
negotiator, whose presence would have helped to isolate specific seizures from political
rhetoric, and whose attention would have been focused exclusively on the property
seizure disputes.
By the close o f the Chilean dispute, it appears as though adequate institutions
had been developed within the U.S. governm ent for handling property seizure disputes.
The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission provided one o f several recourses for
validating claims and determining just com pensation. The Overseas Private Investment
Corporation encouraged U.S. companies to assume a reasonable degree o f risk against
expropriation when investing in markets into which they might not otherwise venture.
The Inter-Agency Expropriation Group enabled a rational and unified U .S. response to
future property seizures, in an era when an increasing number o f U.S. government
agencies have an interest in, and the capability o f influencing, U.S. foreign policy.
This arrangem ent benefits the State D epartm ent by creating a buffer between itself and
its foreign counterparts, alleviating the burden o f verifying and validating claims, and
by providing a forum for devising a coherent approach to U .S. government decision
making.
Although the U .S. weathered four decades of periodic property seizure disputes,
recent events in Latin America indicate that the days o f government seizures o f foreignowned properties may be waning. Dissatisfaction with inefficient and unprofitable
state-run activities over the past two decades pushed most Latin American nations
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toward divestm ent o f these enterprises. However, since it is uncertain w hat the future
holds for the hemisphere, the lessons learned from these earlier experiences must not be
forgotten, and the mechanisms created to help resolve politically-charged property
seizure disputes should continue to be refined.
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